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History

Heinrich von Treitschke: Creating a German National Mission
Chairperson; Linda S. Frey,

A nation’s sense o f its history greatly influenees the way that it perceives its role in the
world. In nineteenth-century Europe, many national historians glorified their nations’
past, often portraying their fellow countrymen as a chosen people with a speeial mission.
In Germany, one historian, Heinrich von Treitschke, had a great impact on the way that
Germans envisioned their nation’s history and national mission.
At the time of his death in 1896, Treitschke held conservative political views and
expressed strong enthusiasm for imperialistic and militaristic policies. Treitschke had not
always entertained such right-wing opinions. As a youth he actually harbored liberal
sympathies. Under the influence of thinkers like Hegel and Maehiavelli, however,
Treitschke shifted from a liberal idealism to a narrowly defined realism. In the process
he developed a eoherent vision o f Germany’s national mission.
Treitschke presented his interpretation of German history in his university lectures and
in his History o f Germany in the Nineteenth Century- He portrayed the German
Reformation as a rebellion from the spiritual tyranny of Rome and as an act that made
Germany a leader o f humanity. This role as a crusader for intelleetual freedom eoupled
with the strength o f the Prussian state entitled Germany, so he argued, to a position of
world hegemony.
Treitschke influenced many Germans, but perhaps none more so than General Friedrieh
von Bemhardi. Writing after Treitschke’s death, Bemhardi appealed to aspects of
Treitschke’s national mission to add authority to his own imperialistie and militaristic
agenda.
Finally, this paper points out that Treitschke’s and Bemhardi’s theories reflected greater
European trends of nationalism, imperialism, and militarism. Their work was not
peculiarly German. They had eounterparts in most European countries.
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INTRODUCTION
NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL HISTORY
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Following the outbreak o f the Great War in 1914, British and American scholars
issued a deluge o f translations o f works by a German historian named Heinrich von
Treitschke. In 1915, Eden and Cedar Paul published the first volume of their translation
o f Treitschke’s History o f Germany in the Nineteenth Century, followed by volume two
in 1916, volume three in 1917, volume four in 1918, and volumes five and six in 1919.
In 1916, Blanche Dugdale and Torben de Bille published their translation of Treitschke’s
two-volume Politics. The titles o f these works appeared harmless enough, but their
translators and other commentators in Britain and America concluded that the ideas
within them were threatening and offensive.
After examining the work of Treitschke, American and British scholars concluded
that he was largely to blame not only for German imperialism and militarism, but also for
the war itself. Charles Sarolea stated in his 1917 German Problems and Personalities
that “more than any other thinker.. .Treitschke must be held responsible for the
catastrophe” of World War I.' He pointed to the “enormous influence of Treitschke on
his countrymen” and wrote, “Since 1914 he has become a household name and a name o f
evil import.”^ In a 1914 book titled Why We Are A t War, a group of Oxford professors
offered more hostile criticisms o f Treitschke, “whose lectures on Po/itzÆ have become a
gospel.”^ “The whole philosophy seems paganism,” wrote the professors, “or rather
barbarism, with a moral veneer.”"^
Joining Treitschke as a target for Western attacks was the German General
Friedrich von Bemhardi, a man whose books on military theory had earned him wide
' Charles Sarolea, German Problems and Personalities (London; Chatta & Windus, 1917), 105.
^ Ibid., 103-104.
^ Members o f the Oxford Faculty o f Modem History, Why We Are A t War: Great B ritain’s Case (Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 1914), 108.
“ ibid., 113.

professional acclaim, but who had also published several highly politicized works in the
years prior to World War 1. As they did with Treitschke’s books, English-speaking
bookstores stocked their shelves with translations of Bemhardi’s chief works. Editions of
his books—with titles such as Germany and the Next War, Britain as Germany’s Vassal,
and How Germany Makes War—became available in the United States and Britain in
1914 and 1915.
Anglo-Saxon critics reacted to Bemhardi just as they did to Treitschke by
damning him as a prophet of war. In a 1915 book entitled The War Lords, A.G. Gardiner
called Bemhardi’s Germany and the Next War an example of “the strange mentality of
Pmssia which has so baffled the world.”^ Bemhardi was “the prophet of war.”^ Gardiner
explained that the Germans “have become obsessed by an idea, the idea o f racial
supremacy, of ‘Kultur’ imposed by the sword in the interests of the inferior types.”’ For
Gardiner, who was blind to British efforts to take up the “white man’s burden,” Great
Britain represented the defender of liberty and democracy. In contrast, the mentality of
Germany “[was] all Force, Force, Force, soulless and cmel and barbaric.”*
While Germany’s enemies in the First World War certainly exaggerated the ideas
of Treitschke and Bemhardi and used them as potent pieces of propaganda, their
accusations were not wholly inaccurate, as these two writers certainly were at least in part
responsible for the chauvinistic, imperialistic, and militaristic sentiments that permeated
parts of German society before the Great War. While impossible to quantify,
Treitschke’s influence on the mind of Imperial Germany was undeniable. “It is scarcely

^ A.G. Gardiner, The War Lords (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1915), 250.
®Ibid., 265.
’ Ibid., 252.
* Ibid., 263.

possible,” observes Paul Kennedy, “to go through the memoirs of the Wilhelmine Right
without encountering some reference to the impact which Treitschke had made upon their
formative thoughts.”^ Among those who expressed their debt to Treitschke were men no
less influential than Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow, as
well as Bemhardi.
In the minds— or at least in the words—of Western propagandists, Treitschke and
Bemhardi were not regarded simply as two men among many who had a hand in
influencing a part o f German society’s conceptions of itself and the world around it.
According to Anglo-Saxon critics, these two men had single-handedly indoctrinated the
German nation with their radical ideas. German pacifists, liberals, and others who
reacted unfavorably to Treitschke and Bemhardi were entirely ignored as the West
painted a picture of German society as a uniform product of Treitschke’s teachings.
Some Britons and Americans at least presented— and perhaps truly believed—that
Germans were indeed “peculiar” in comparison with their Westem counterparts. The
chauvinism and militarism present in Treitschke’s and Bemhardi’s publications were
viewed as an aberration in Westem Civilization.
O f course, in its enthusiasm for militarism and imperialism the German nation
was by no means unique in Europe. Nationalistic extremism like that of Treitschke’s and
Bemhardi’s infected most, if not all, European nation-states. Britons gloried in their
empire, upon which the sun never set. Pan-Slavism captured the attention of many
Russians and Slavs in other Eastem European states. France witnessed the tirades of Paul
Déroulède and the rise o f a substantial revanchist faction within its govemment.

^ Paul Kennedy, The Rise o f the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Ashfield Press, 1987),
395.

In such a climate o f national enthusiasm, historians were not immune from the
popular mood. Nineteenth-century historians produced a high number of national
histories, many of them epie in length and stylistically beautiful. While many of these
historians portrayed their respective nations as specially unique, they shared several
common methods and objectives. Each historian saw his own nation as a chosen people,
as a culture somehow superior, either culturally, politically, or spiritually, to all others.
Nationalist historians often interpreted their nations’ supposed peculiarities as
justifications for various national missions. Finally, these historians all sought to glorify
their nations’ pasts in an effort to rally popular support for national policies in the
present, an exercise that often led them to portray falsely aspects of their nations’ past.
In France, Jules Michelet made no attempt to disguise his goal of writing a French
national epic, at one point remarking that he envisioned his Histoire de la Révolution
française, eompleted in 1853, as “an epic poem with the people as the hero.”*'^ Michelet
devoted much time to celebrating the aecomplishments of the French Revolution. One
historian has written that Michelet regarded the Revolution as “an epic of liberty and a
crusade for the emancipation o f the people,”’* while another has described his work as a
“hymn to the glories o f France as the principal actor in the drama of liberty.”’^ Often
noted for its stylistie brillianee, Michelet’s work assigned to France a glorious national
mission as the deliverer o f liberty to the oppressed peoples of the world. Voltaire and
Rousseau appeared as “twin apostles of humanity,” and for Michelet the Revolution was

Jules Michelet quoted in Charles-Olivier Carbonell, “Jules Michelet,” in Lucian Boia (ed.), Great
Historians o f the Modern Age: An International Dictionary
York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 252.
" Harry Elmer Barnes, A History o f Historical Writing (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962), 215.
G.P. Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), 170.

by far the greatest historical event ever: “She came not as a nation hut as Justice, Eternal
Reason, demanding nothing o f men hut that they should realize their own highest
aspirations.”^^
In Britain, several historians also glorified aspects of their nation’s past.
Described hy one author as a “volcanic secular prophet,”*"*Thomas Carlyle set out in his
1845 Oliver Cromwell’s Letters and Speeches, with Elucidations “to vindicate both the
character and the policy o f his hero.”'^ In this four-volume work Carlyle presented
Cromwell as a “Hero-Ring” who made great personal sacrifices for the good of his
nation.*^ F.R. Floumey concludes that Carlyle succeeded in rectifying the then overly
critical perception of Cromwell, hut in doing so he grossly overcompensated, sanctifying
the man to an unbelievable degree:
The Cromwell o f Carlyle was always right in his policies. His brutalities were explained
away or approved. Those who differed with him, whether Royalists, Fifth Monarchy
Men, or simple Republicans, were subjected to vicious ridicule.'’

A disciple o f Carlyle’s and “one of the most intensely nationalistic of English
historians,”** James Anthony Froude glorified British history after the style of his teacher
in his History o f England from the Fall ofWolsey to the defeat o f the Armada, completed
in 1870. The work had great “pictorial power” and “captivated the reading public,”*^ but
was ultimately marred by its author’s strong Protestant bias. Froude portrayed the
English Reformation as a “[fight] for truth, honesty, and private judgment against

Michelet quoted in Gooch, 174.
Harold T. Parker, “Thomas Carlyle,” in Boia, 190.
Gooch, 306.
F.R. Fluomay, “Thomas Carlyle,” in Herman Ausubel, J. Bartlett Brebner and Erling M. Hunt (eds.),
Some Modern Historians o f Britain: Essays in Honor o f R.L. Schuyler by Some o f his Former Students
(New York: The Dreyden Press, 1951), 39-40.
Ibid., 40.
Barnes, 219.
Parker, “James Anthony Froude,” in Boia, 198.

priestcraft and ecclesiastical tyranny.”^'’ He presented Rome as “the enslaver of mind and
soul.”^' For Froude, the English Reformation marked the beginning o f England’s rise to
national greatness. Ultimately, though, Froude failed to curb his own biases. Gooch
concludes that his “lack of impartiality.. .excludes [him] from the first rank of
historians.”^^
Perhaps the best known o f the British national historians was Thomas Babington
Macauley, who was a formative influence on Treitschke. Known for his literary ability,
Macauley once declared that “[t]o be a really great historian.. .was perhaps the rarest of
intellectual distinctions.”^^ In his extremely popular History o f England from the
Accession o f James the Second, completed in 1855 in four volumes, Macauley portrayed
the Glorious Revolution of 1688 as one of the greatest moments of history. Writing in
the wake of the revolutions o f 1848, Macauley saw the English Revolution as a model for
all revolutions:
It was a revolution strictly defensive. In almost every word and act may be discerned a
profound reverence for the past. O f all revolutions the least violent, it has been o f all
revolutions the most beneficent. Its highest eulogy is that it was our last revolution.^'*

The historian lauded the efforts of William III, portraying him as a man who sacrificed all
self-interest for the “interests o f Protestant Europe.” Ultimately, Macauley’s History
was, in the words of Gooch, “a paean to the Revolution and to its principal author.”^^
Enthusiasm for national history also found expression in Russia, where it was one
of the few types o f literature permitted under the repressive censorship of the

^ Froude quoted in Lionel Milner Angus-Butterworth, Ten M aster Historians (Freeport, NY ; Books for
Libraries Press, 1961), 131.
Gooch, 311.
^ Ibid., 314.
Ibid., 111.
Macauley quoted in Gooch, 283.
Gooch, 88.

Romanovs?^ Russia’s first significant national historian, Nikolai Mikhailovich
Karamzin, completed his twelve-volume History o f the Russian State in 1824. Early in
his life Karamzin had entertained liberal political inclinations, but as he aged his politics
grew increasingly conservative and he developed strongly Slavophile and “conservative
[nationalist]” views.^’ In his History “[H]e depict[ed] the early princes as absolute rulers,
and present[ed] Ivan III, who freed Russia from the Tartars, as the ideal monarch.”
Gooch observes that Karamzin’s work “has been called the epic of despotism.”^*
Throughout the work, the Russian historian argued “that autocracy alone had bestowed
all the blessings that the Russian Empire had ever enjoyed.”^^
O f course, enthusiasm for national history took hold in Germany as well. German
historians, however, faced a dilemma that other European historians did not. As
Germany did not exist as a national state until 1871, the Prussian school of German
historians— Heinrich von Sybel, Johann Gustav Droysen, and Heinrich von Treitschke—
wrote highly politicized accounts of the German past directed at harnessing national
enthusiasm in support of German unification, which they all deeply desired. This trend
was so apparent among these three historians that they are often referred to as the
“political school,” an apt characterization considering these historians considered history
to be a political device to affect policy in the present and future.
What these historians wanted to change was the political structure of Germany
agreed upon by the delegates at the Congress of Vienna in 18I4-I815. Chiefly
orchestrated by the Austrian foreign minister Klemens von Mettemich, the Congress
^ Barnes, 224.
A.V. Semenova, “Nikolai Mikhailovich Karamzin,” in Boia, 548; and Anatole G. Mazour, Modern
Russian Historiography (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1958), 62-66.
28
Gooch, 414.
29 1
Mazour, 66.

,

pursued as a primary aim the restoration of the continental equilibrium to a semblance of
its eighteenth-century balance of power. To recreate the pre-Revolutionary balance,
Mettemich and his fellow delegates determined that Central Europe had to remain
divided and established in the middle of Europe the German Confederation, or Bund,
described by one historian as “a loose federation of thirty-five monarchical states and
four city republics,” two of which were Austria and Pmssia.^*^ The creation of the Bund
in June of 1815 effectively left Central Europe in a state of political disunity.
Henry Kissinger has written that Mettemich’s primary concern “was the
construction of the strong Central Europe which he considered the condition of European
stability and Austrian s e c u r i t y . T o maintain a stable Central Europe, Mettemich
ensured a dominant position for Austria within the Bund. He could only do this, explains
Kissinger,
by creating a political structure which would by its inner logic have to rely on Austrian
support; by calling into being a multiplicity o f sovereignties which would have a joint
interest with Austria in frustrating the twin movement o f nationalism and liberalism.^^

Kissinger identifies Mettemich’s two primary political goals as the paralysis of “the two
powers he considered revolutionary, Russia in Europe and Pmssia in G e r m a n y . T h e
Austrian statesman worked to thwart Pmssia’s potential as a nationalizing force in
Germany: “fear of the national mission of Pmssia became the unifying element within
the German Confederation under Austria’s tutelage.”^"^
By 1818 Mettemich had achieved his goal of a stable Central Europe dominated

^ Hajo Holbom, A History o f Modern Germany vol. 2 1648-1840 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964),
445.
Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Mettemich, Castlereagh, and the Problems o f Peace, 1812-1822
(New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964), 232.
Ibid., 232.
” Ibid., 233.
Ibid., 235.

politically by Austria. Nationalist and revolutionary sentiment did persist, though, as
evidenced by Karl Sand’s murder of the journalist Kotzebue, suspected of spying for
tsarist Russia, in 1818. This event gave the Austrian statesman a pretext for repressing
civil liberties, such as freedom of the press, which European statesmen debated at
Karlsbad in August of 1818. The resulting Karlsbad Decrees, “railroaded through the
Frankfurt Diet” on September 20, 1819,^^ ineluded measures for censorship of the press
and regulation o f German universities, with the ultimate aim of “seperat[ing] Prussia
from German nationalism” and “paralys[ing] the efforts of certain Prussian statesman.. .to
ally Prussia with German liberalism.”^^ Kissinger explains that the Karlsbad Decrees
“ended, for the time being, the dream of a unified Germany.”^’
By 1848 the frustrations of German liberals living under Mettemich’s repression
coalesced with social and political tensions triggered by the initial stages of European
industrialization, creating a volatile situation in Germany that erupted in revolt in March
o f that year. The 1848ers primarily sought the creation of a German national state, seeing
national unification as a vehicle for achieving desperately sought political freedoms.
Deutschland iiber Allés, which was written in 1841 but would become the future national
anthem o f a united Germany, reflects several of the goals of the 1848 revolutionaries.
One line reads, “Let us strive fraternally for unity, law, and liberty with heart and
hand.”^*
In the Vormarz, the period leading up to the revolution, German liberals had
begun to regard national unity and state power as perquisites for liberal political
35

Holbom, M odem Germany 2: 466.
Kissinger, 241-243.
Ibid., 244.
Deutschland iiber Allés quoted in Holbom, A History o f Modern Germany vol. 3 1840-1945 (New York;
Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 41.
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demands. The first thinker to publicize such views was Paul Pfizer, a Swabian, who in
1831-32 argued in his Correspondence Between Two Germans that a “constitutional
system.. .could achieve its full liberalizing results only by turning a culturally united
people into a political nation.”^^ Pfizer added that any movement for liberal reforms and
national unity would require a certain degree of power, which he believed could only
come from the Prussian state. Pfizer was one of the first intellectuals to assign Prussia a
nationalizing mission, but the desire for a Prussian-led unification of Germany soon
became the dominant theme o f many German liberals.
One German liberal who shared Pfizer’s conviction that only power could ensure
national unity and liberal reforms was Friedrieh Christoph Dahlmann, who, severely
disillusioned after the aborted 1848 revolution, proclaimed in the Frankfurt Assembly on
January 22, 1849,
The path o f power is the only one that will satisfy and appease the fermenting impulse to
freedom— for it is not solely freedom that the German is thinking of, it is rather power,
which has hitherto been refused him, and after which he hankers.'*®

Dahlmann soon became the leading advocate of the Prussian-led unification of Germany.
The “spiritual father” o f the Prussian school of German historians, Dahlmann instilled in
his students the belief that historical writing “must lead in the present, if possible with
stronger current than the Rhine.”'*^ Droysen, Sybel, and Treitschke, following
Dahlmann’s teaching, all hoped to “prove” Prussia’s destiny as the national unifier of
Germany by finding evidence of a Prussian “mission” in the past.
Johann Gustav Droysen, bom in 1808 in Pomerania, held professorships at Kiel,

Holbom, Modern Germany 3: 42.
Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann quoted in Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine o f Raison
D ’État and its Place in M odem History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 395-396.
Heinrich von Treitschke, Preussische Jahrbiicher 1 (1861), quoted in Walter Bussmann, Treitschke:
Sein Welt- und Geschichtsbild (Gottingen: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1952), 34.
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Jena, and Berlin. A liberal early in life, Droysen served in the Frankfiirt Assembly of
1848 and was a member o f the “moderate liberal ‘Casino’ group or 'Erbkaiserpartei,'’ the
supporters of a hereditary emperor.”'*^ Over time, however, Droysen shifted to the right
politically, “finally even vindicat[ing] the starken Machtstaat, thus justifying
imperialism, militarism, and the oppression of political opposition.”^^ In the spirit of the
Prussian school, Droysen dutifully espoused the conviction that Prussia’s historical
mission was to unify all of Germany under the Hohenzollem crown. Two of his early
works— Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen (1833) and Geschichte des Hellenismus
(1843)—attempted to draw a parallel between Alexander and Macedonia on the one hand
and the Hohenzollem monarchy and Prussia on the other. Droysen believed that
Alexander’s conquest of Greece could serve as a model for Prussia’s unification of
Germany/*'' In his “Memorial of a Schleswig-Holsteiner,” Droysen, the Pomeranian
native, wrote that Prussia could not allow Austria to act as the strongest power in
Germany.'*^
The second historian of the Pmssian school, Heinrich von Sybel, was bom in
Düsseldorf in 1817 and held chairs at Borm, Marburg, and Munich, before he began
overseeing the Pmssian archives in Berlin in 1875. In 1859 he founded the Historische
Zeitschrift, which he edited until his death in 1895 and which has since become a major
joumal of German historiography.'*^ Like Droysen, Sybel advocated a Pmssian-led
unification of Germany, excluding Austria. In “The German Nation and the Empire”

Peter Schumann, “Johann Gustav Droysen,” in Walther Killy and Rudolf Vierhaus (eds.), Dictionary o f
German Biography (DOB) (Munich: K.G. Saur, 2002), 688.
Horst Walter Blanke, “Johann Gustav Droysen,” in Boia, 276.
Blanke, 274.
Gooch, 127-129.
Hans Schleier, “Heinrich von Sybel,” in Boia, 317.
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Sybel called for the removal of Austria from German affairs, writing, “As sure as the
stream flows forward, Germany will form a close union under the lead o f its strong
member.”"^^ O f course, he saw Prussia as the “strong member.” In 1894 Sybel finished
his seven-volume Foundation o f the German Empire by William I, which one historian
has called “a highly partisan defense of Bismarck’s politics and diplomacy,”"^* and
another “an apologetic vindication of Bismarck’s policies.”^^
Perhaps more than the other members of the Prussian school, Treitschke, the
youngest of the three historians, took Dahlmann’s words—history “must lead in the
present”^®—to heart. Treitschke devoted his life and scholarly career, which are
discussed in detail below, to the single goal of German national unity. His essays and
lectures prior to 1871 vigorously advocated the need for a German state unified under the
aegis of Prussia. Following unification, Treitschke modified his message slightly to
account for the creation o f the German Empire, but the same dominant themes remained
until his death in 1896.
What Treitschke accomplished was nothing less than the creation of a coherent
national ideology for the German people. In The Idea o f Nationalism,^^ Hans Kohn has
provided a rich definition o f nationalism and its necessary components, all of which
Treitschke presented in his History o f Germany in the Nineteenth Century and his
Politics. Kohn argues that the ancient Hebrews were the first people to really develop a
sense o f nationhood and nationalism. Regarding themselves as a chosen people, they

47

Heinrich von Sybel quoted in Gooch, 131.
^ Barnes, 211.
Schleier, 317.
Dahlmann quoted in Bussmann, 34.
Hans Kohn, The Idea o f Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1944).
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shared a common history and a missionary or messianic zeal. In his main historical
work, the German History, the first volume of which was published in 1879, Treitschke
sought to give the German nation, which had only recently been united under one
sovereign, a sense o f a common national history, “the fundamental condition of national
consciousness.”^^
Treitschke also presented the German people as a chosen people. With Luther’s
Reformation, the German nation became a “new Israel.” Other scholars have emphasized
the importance o f a sense o f “chosenness” to any national consciousness and nationalism.
In her work on British nationalism Linda Colley has argued that this sentiment was
crucial to the genesis of British national consciousness. Eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury Britons thought of their nation as a “Protestant Israel.
More than anything else, though, Treitschke established for Germany a sense of
national mission, something that Hannah Arendt has called “the most dangerous concept
o f nationalism.”^"^ He commanded his fellow countrymen to devote their energies to
bolstering the power o f the German state and asserting themselves as a world power. He
found justification for such a mission in the German past, particularly in the traditions of
the Prussian state and the Hohenzollem dynasty. Through a policy of imperial
expansion, perhaps violent in nature, Treitschke wanted Germany to rise to a hegemonic
position not just in Europe, but also in the world, just as Pmssia had asserted itself as the
hegemon in Germany. Treitschke’s message found a receptive audience in men like
Friedrich von Bemhardi and other members of the radical right who could look to
Treitschke to legitimize their own adventurous plans.
Ibid., 35.
Linda Colley,
Forging the Nation, 7707-7537 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 369.
Hannah Arendt, The Origins o f Totalitarianism, 2d ed. (New York: Harcourt, 1968), 182.
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CHAPTER ONE
TREITSCHKE’S LIFE AND INTELLECTUAL DEVELOMENT:
IN SEARCH OF A NATIONAL MISSION
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Treitschke, described by G.P. Goocb as “[t]be youngest, greatest and last o f the
Prussian School” and as the historian who “most completely embodies the blending of
history and politics which it is the aim of the school to achieve,” was perhaps the greatest
culprit in falsifying German history.^ Andreas Dorpalen has called Treitschke the “most
vocal” representative of the Prussian school, an accurate qualification considering
Treitsehke spent the majority of his career as a historian shrilly espousing the national
mission of Prussia, and, once unification had been achieved, the national mission of
Germany. In his efforts to holster claims of a German national mission, Treitschke
revealed his chauvinistic enthusiasm for imperialistic and militaristic policies, as well as
his exaggerated emphasis on the importance o f the state.
The German historian had not always held such views, however, nor had he
always been so sure o f Prussia’s destiny as the defender of all “German” interests. In
1848, while only fourteen years old and too young to take part in the revolution,
Treitschke watched the events unfold in his home city of Dresden. An adolescent with
liberal sympathies, he desperately hoped for the adoption of the proposed liberal
constitution. After 1848, however, Treitschke’s political views changed greatly from his
youthful liberal idealism. The formative intellectual influences of Treitschke’s life
pushed him increasingly to the right of the political spectrum toward a narrowly
nationalistic realism. As he evolved intellectually, Treitschke increasingly defined his
political goals as national unification at any and all costs and, with ever growing
intensity, he called on the Prussian state to complete this mission.
Bom into a military family, Heinrich von Treitschke was bom on September 15,
1834 in Dresden in Saxony. Eduard von Treitschke, Heinrich’s father, made his living in
' Gooch, 138.
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the military; he had beeome a lieutenant in the Saxon army fighting against Napoleon’s
forces in the Wars o f Liberation. Treitsehke’s grandfather had even served under George
Washington in the American Revolution.^ By 1834, Eduard had risen to the rank of
general. He had been bom a commoner, but was knighted by the Saxon king prior to
Heinrich’s birth. An avowed Saxon, not a German nationalist, Eduard generally opposed
efforts toward German unification, especially under the yoke of the hated Prassians.
Eduard von Treitschke was also devoutly Protestant, an aspect of his character that would
lead to many disputes with his son.^
As a child, Heinrich suffered from poor health and began to go deaf at an early
age, an affliction that prevented him from following his father’s career in the military.
Dorpalen has addressed the impact of Treitschke’s deafness—he was virtually completely
deaf when he died in 1896—upon his political ideas. As he grew older and his affliction
worsened, Treitschke lost the ability to comprehend completely reactions to his extreme
statements. He was unable to truly see his “effect upon his audiences” and his deafiress
“cut [him] off from exchanges of views.

It would be impossible to quantify the impact

Treitschke’s handicap made on his intellectual development, but there can be no doubt
that Treitsehke’s deafness was a significant influence on the evolution of his political and
social worldview, a factor that most historians have probably underestimated.
Treitsehke spent his youth in conservative Dresden. As the young Saxon
developed political and social views independent of his family’s, his increasing liberalism
and nationalism led to much feuding between Heinrich and his family, who remained
^ H.W.C. Davis, The Political Thought o f Heinrich von Treitschke (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1915), 1.
^ Ibid., 2.
Andreas Dorpalen, “Heinrich von Treitschke,” Journal o f Contemporary History 7: % (July-October
1972): 30.
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defenders of the old order. Disputes between the younger and elder Treitschke became
especially intense. In spite of the conservative and anti-Prussian sentiments of his
family—or perhaps because of and in rebellion against them—Treitschke developed very
independent political views. He once wrote,
I was brought up in the atmosphere o f the Court o f Dresden, in circles whose political
idea was hatred o f Prussia. If therefore I think highly o f Prussia, this conviction is at
least the fruit o f independent study. ^

Ultimately, even Heinrich’s decision to pursue a career as a historian spawned the
ridicule of family members, who did not regard an academic career as a suitable endeavor
for nobility. Adolf Hausrath, a friend of Treitschke’s, wrote in his biography of the
historian that one of Heinrich’s relatives once suggested “the stable career” (taking care
o f horses) as a suitable alternative to military service, a remark for which Heinrich never
forgave him.^
Treitschke was first exposed to liberal and nationalist ideas when he entered the
public Holy Cross Gymnasium in 1846. “For the first time the boy learned something of
the aspirations of the national and liberal movements,” explains Dorpalen. “His history
teacher spoke to him about the power and glory o f a united Germany. Other instructors
aroused his interest in their efforts to obtain a liberalization of Saxony’s government.”^
As mentioned above, Treitschke was too young to participate in the revolutions of 1848,
but the events did not go unnoticed. One of his gymnasium teachers was even active as a
leader in the revolution.* As he watched the revolutionary activity Treitschke “was tom
between his hope for an acceptance of the constitution and his hostility toward the

^ Heinrich von Treitschke, Briefe ii, no. 428, quoted in Davis, 1.
®A dolf Hausrath, Treitschke, His Doctrine o f German Destiny and o f International Relations, Together
with a Study o f his Life and Work (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1914), 42.
Dorpalen, Treitschke, 5.
' Davis, 2.
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elements which supported it.”^ The Saxon King Frederick Augustus’s ultimate refusal
to accept a constitution appalled Treitschke.
Eventually, the Saxon govemment had to request the aid of the Prussians to quell
the revolt, an experience that helped convince Treitschke that German unification could
only be brought about by a powerful Prussia.

In a lecture delivered to his classmates at

Holy Cross, he “vindicated the services of Prussia to the cause of German unity.”*^
Dorpalen notes that the “vacillations of the Saxon king” during the revolutions aroused in
Treitschke nothing but s c o r n . H e was appalled by Saxony’s dependence on its stronger
neighbor. A letter to his father reveals that even as a youth of fourteen, Treitschke had
begun to develop a serious aversion to small states and their political impotence, a
sentiment that would become one of the major themes of his mature thought. “Wretched,
wretched,” he wrote, “is it to see how Saxony waits and waits till the decision comes, in
order then to set her sails to the wind and humbly join the victorious side.”' ”*
In April o f 1851, shortly after graduating from high school, Treitschke left his
native Saxony to begin his university studies at Bonn,*^ where he was exposed to two
great influences that helped confirm his conviction in Prussia’s national mission and also
pushed his political views farther to the right. Perhaps most importantly, at Bonn
Treitschke met Dahlmann, who supported the idea o f a constitutional monarchy for
Germany and political unification under Prussian leadership.*® In his study of

®Dorpalen, Treitschke, 8.
Davis, 2.
11
Dorpalen, Treitschke, 9.
Davis, 3.
Dorpalen, Treitschke, 8.
Treitschke, as quoted in J.W. Headlam, “Heinrich von Treitschke,” The English Historical Review 12: 48
(October 1897): 731.
Dorpalen, Treitschke, 12.
Davis, 3.
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Treitschke’s intellectual development, Walter Bussmann has written that Dahlmann made
the greatest “human” impression on Treitschke/^ From Dahlmann Treitschke acquired a
belief that “conviction” was a legitimate base for political and historical judgment.
Dahlmann’s Politik, published in 1835, stated that political negotiation must derive from
conviction, and that government officials should “not be the advocates of an assignment,
they should be the representatives of a political conviction.”^* Moreover, Dahlmann
instilled in Treitschke the belief that historical writing “must lead in the present, if
possible with stronger current than our Rhine.”*^
At Bonn Treitschke was certainly exposed to the Anglophilic views of Dahlmann.
Charles McClelland has assigned Dahlmann to a group of German “constitutionalists,”
who “looked upon England as an elder brother to be emulated or at least admired.”^^
These constitutionalists, who also included Friedrich Murhard and Karl von Rotteck,
consistently expressed several common themes. First, they envisioned the British
political system as the embodiment of Montesquieu’s Spirit o f the Laws, with legislative,"
judicial, and executive branches o f government all checking the power of the others.
McClelland maintains that Dahlmann always held the false image of Britain as a “great,
strong, balanced constitutional monarchy.”^' The second theme of this school of
historians, and also a second misconception, saw the British monarchy as the ultimate
power within the state. They failed to recognize the dominant position o f the British
Parliament, and envisioned “a strong king, of course, to guarantee social justice within

” Bussmann, 33.
Dahlmann, “Die Politik auf den Grand und das Mass der gegebenen Umstande zuriickgefiihrt,” quoted in
Bussmann, 33-34
Treitschke in Preussische Jahrbiicher 1 (1861), quoted in Bussmann, 34.
Charles E. McClelland, The German Historians and England: A Study in Nineteenth Century Views
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1971), 64.
Ibid., 72.
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the system.”^^
Early in his academic career Treitschke shared Dahlmann's and the
constitutionalists’ admiration of Great Britain and her political system. In 1852, while
still at Bonn, the liberal Treitschke expressed great enthusiasm for the English
constitution: “I derive great pleasure from it because it is a subject which necessarily
awakens admiration and enthusiasm.”^^ Macauley’s— “whose judgment was swift and
simple”— and other Whig histories of England further aroused Treitschke’s admiration
and contributed to his belief that “conviction” was a legitimate foundation for historical
assessment.^"* Treitschke called Macauley’s History o f England a “splendid book, a
magnificent conception o f history.” He “could think for hours about a single phrase
tossed out by Maeauley.”^^ Six years later Treitschke still expressed high regard for
English history. In 1858 he wrote, “Admiration is the first feeling which the study of
English history calls forth in everyone.”^^ Treitschke’s advocacy of the English model
for the German constitution persisted for over a decade until the events of 1866 and 1870
convinced him o f what he perceived to be the inherent flaws of such a form of
government.
The philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Hegel, whose thought helped solidify in
Treitschke his conviction of a Prussian national mission and his enthusiasm for state
power, represented the other significant influence upon Treitschke’s intellectual
development at Bonn. Hans Kohn has argued that the thought of Treitsehke owed much
Ibid., 72-73.
^ Heinrich von Treitschke, Briefe, ed. Max Comicelius, 2d ed., 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1914-18) 1: 115, letter
dated Bonn, 28 February 1852, quoted in McClelland, 170.
McClelland, 171.
Treitschke, letter to his father, dated Leipzig, 21 January 1853, Briefe, 1: 153, quoted in McClelland,
171.
^ Treitschke, “Grundlagen der englischen Freiheit,” Preussische Jahrbiicher 1 (1858): 368, quoted in
McClelland, 168.
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to Hegel, who championed the notion of “history and the state as vehicles for the
Divine.”^^ Indeed, much of Treitsehke’s thought shared Hegel’s admiration of the state
as a moral end. “The state is the true embodiment of mind and spirit,” Hegel once wrote,
“and only as its member the individual shares in truth, real existence and ethical status.”^^
Kohn suggests that Hegel’s philosophy “diverted the German mind farther and farther
from the liberalism o f Western civilization.”^^ In light of the work of the historians Geoff
Eley and David Blackboum, who have successfully refuted notions that Germany’s
political and social development represented some type of aberration in Western
civilization, Kohn’s statement about the mind of Germany may be somewhat
questionable.^® There can be no doubt, however, that under the influence of Hegel
Treitsehke’s mind wandered farther and farther from the liberalism of its youth. The
young historian began to view the state as the supreme end of society; it was the “Divine
Will as it exists on Earth.”^'
In his Machiavellism, Friedrich Meineeke analyzes the thought of Hegel,
especially his conception of the state and its role. Like Treitschke after him, Hegel found
much to praise in the writings of Machiavelli. He wrote that the Florentine statesman had
“grasped with a cool circumspection the necessary idea that Italy should be saved by
being combined into one state.”^^ Hegel maintained the “necessity” of this idea, and
Meineeke writes that Hegel fully excused Machiavelli’s methods, “pour[ing] scorn on the

Hans Kohn, Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1952), 112.
Hegel as quoted in Kohn, Prophets and Peoples, 118.
^ Kohn, Prophets and Peoples, 112.
^ See David Blackboum and G eoff Eley, The Peculiarities o f German History: Bourgeois Society and
Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).
Kohn, Prophets and Peoples, 119
Hegel quoted in Meineeke, 358.
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trivialities of ordinary morality.”^^ Hegel did not see the means advocated by
Machiavelli as necessarily timeless, but he strongly supported the notion that the creation
of a nation-state justified often immoral methods: “The only part that seemed to him
valid for all time was the root-kemel of the doctrine, that the idea of a State, which ought
to form one nation, should be brought to realization by means of all the methods
necessary for that purpose.”^"^
Hegel linked state morality to the idea of personal duty:
The morality o f the State is not the moral, the reflective element, whereby personal
conviction is the ruling element; the latter is more accessible to the modem world,
whereas the true and ancient type has its roots in the principle that everyone has his

duty/^

This assertion that the state itself possessed an inherent moral value took hold of
Treitsehke perhaps more than any other theory to which he was exposed. He began to
advocate state power and the enhancement of that power with increasing vehemence.
Later in life he would write,
Hegel was the first to press into the sanctuary itself. He understood the state as the reality
o f the moral idea, as the national moral will, and with one blow overthrew all the
doctrines o f natural law and political Romantik, which deduced the state from original
contract or divine foundations. In this way the exaggerated idea o f the state o f classical
antiquity acquired new life, and to the state was assigned an omnipotence which does not
belong to it, since the Christian world has recognized the rights o f conscience. But the
deification o f the state did little harm among a people which had so long sought its ideal
in a stateless freedom. Only by overvaluing the state could the Germans attain to a
powerful feeling for the state.

In addition to giving the state innate moral value, Hegel had also assigned the
state a civilizing and cultural mission. An important part of a state’s duty was to develop
its citizenry intellectually and spiritually:
The supreme goal that a State can achieve, is that art and science should be developed in
it, and a height attained which corresponds to the mind and spirit o f the people. This is
Meineeke, 358.
Ibid.
Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, G. Lasson (ed.), quoted in Meineeke, 361.
Treitschke quoted in Headlam, 741.
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the highest purpose o f the State, but it is a purpose which the state must not attempt to
produce as a construction; on the contrary, it must create itself out o f itself/^

Treitschke adopted a very similar eonception of the state’s role. He saw it as a civilizing
force, working to develop the nation morally, spiritually, and intellectually. Because he
held a very pessimistic view of human nature, Treitschke was convinced of the need for a
strong state that could function as a moralizing agent in society.
In 1852, Treitschke returned to his native Saxony to attend the university at
Leipzig, where he studied under the economist Wilhelm Roscher, whose influence
contributed to Treitschke’s increasing tendency to interpret political and economic events
in narrowly nationalistie terms. At Leipzig Treitschke attended a series of Roscher’s
lectures that were later published as Die Grundlagen der Nationaldkonomie, in which the
professor argued that just as different countries were better suited to different forms of
government, so were they better suited to different types of economic organization.
Universal, or natural, laws did not apply to economic relations in every country. Roscher
rejected the theories o f the classical economists Smith and Ricardo, whose laws
supposedly governed all economic relations, everywhere.^* “There was no one perfect
economic system, he taught, no more than there was one perfect government,” explains
Dorpalen.*^ Dorpalen points out that Roscher remained very cautious in his scholarship,
“[deducing] his conclusions from careful, objective comparisons” and maintaining some
vestiges o f universalism.
Treitschke, on the other hand, limited his comparisons to a select number o f living
peoples, pointedly chosen fo r his specific political purposes. In his thinking there was no
longer room for those last vestiges o f a universal approach which still survived in the
teachings o f Dahlmann and Roscher.

Hegel, Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, quoted in Meineeke, 367.
^ Dorpalen, Treitschke, 19; and Davis, 3.
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Aside from Roscher’s lectures, Treitschke found little that interested him in
Leipzig. At Bonn he had formed many satisfying relationships with other like-minded
students, but he thought the Leipzig students possessed a repulsive ‘“ crassly materialistic’
approach to their studies in which they saw mere gateways to profitable careers.”"^*
Treitschke did enjoy the company of several of Leipzig’s elite to whom his father
introduced him. In this group o f well-to-do professionals the young student was
pleasantly surprised to find some men of similar political inclinations. The enjoyment he
got from these associations was not enough, however, to allay his utter distaste for life in
Leipzig. Frustrated with life there, Treitschke returned to Bonn in 1853, where he once
again formed satisfying friendships with other students.'*^
After one term at Bonn, Treitschke transferred to Tübingen, to whieh he “took an
instant dislike.”"'^ Treitschke’s greatest complaint against the Tübingers was their
stauneh south German particularism. “Particularism is in full bloom,” Treitschke once
wrote, “few [of the students] have ever crossed the borders of black and red territory. We
North Germans (all in all twenty) are quite isolated, for we are ‘heartless and superfieial,’
as the Swabian th in k s .D o r p a le n writes that Treitschke simply could not understand
the particularist mentality o f the Swabians, nor did he ever make any effort to understand
it, curtly dismissing it as “unnatural” and “corrupt.”'^^ After Tübingen, Treitsehke studied
in Freiburg and then Heidelberg, where he finished his eareer as a student in March of

Ibid.
Ibid., 20-23.
Ibid., 25.
Treitschke quoted in Dorpalen, Treitschke, 25. Treitschke’s term “black-and-red territory” refers to the
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1855/^
In his student days Treitschke had dabhled in poetry. In fact, before finally
deciding to pursue a career as a historian, the young Saxon seriously considered devoting
his life to poetry. In 1856 he even published a book of verses entitled Vaterlandische
Gedichte (Patriotic Songs). As the title of the collection implies, Treitschke’s obsession
with the political ideal of German unification infiltrated even his p o e try .T h e s e poems
were no flowery verses about romantic love. Rather, like all of Treitschke’s other
publications, they promoted the single goal of German national unification. He even
opened the volume with an excerpt from Machiavelli’s Golden Donkey that urged the
people around him to take action to achieve German unification instead of waiting idly
for some divine miracle.'^^ In 1857 he published a second volume. Studies, which
revealed an even harsher distaste for what he saw as political apathy and shallow
materialism. He attacked the “selfish greed” of his generation, which was “[ejngaged in
breathless, never ending deals” with hearts “as smooth as glass.”"*^
After several months at home with his family in Dresden, Treitsehke traveled to
Gottingen, where he spent the years 1855-1856 occupying himself with Machiavelli’s
The Prince and Aristotle’s Politics, two works that would become major influences upon
the German historian’s social and political w orldview .T reitschke was deeply indebted
to Aristotle for molding his conception of the state. From the ancient Greek Treitschke
adopted a belief in the state as the “core of all national life.”^’ Again revealing his highly
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pessimistic view o f human nature, Treitschke permitted the state
the right to be omnipotent over the individual because the individual could never develop
or live a worthy life without the State’s protection and guidance; because the state was
the supreme moralizing and humanizing agency in human life/^

The thought of Machiavelli made a powerful impact on Treitschke as well and
had the effect of strengthening his enthusiasm for a strong state. In an 1856 letter to his
father, Treitschke lauded the philosophy of the Florentine:
He sacrifices right and virtue to a great idea, the might and unity o f his nation. This
fundamental idea o f the book— the fiery patriotism and the conviction that even the most
oppressive despotism must be welcomed if it warrants the might and unity o f the
fatherland— these are the ideas which reconcile me with the many objectionable and
terrible opinions o f the great Florentine.

On another occasion Treitschke wrote of Machiavelli’s The Prince,
He is indeed a practical statesman, more fitted than any other to destroy the illusion that
one can reform the world with cannon loaded only with ideas o f Right and Truth. But
even the political science o f this much-decried champion o f brute force seems to me
moral by comparison with the Prussia o f to-day [51c]. Machiavelli sacrifices Right and
Virtue to a great idea, the might and unity o f his people; this one cannot say o f the party
which now rules in Prussia. This underlying thought o f the book, its glowing patriotism,
and the conviction that the most oppressive despotism must be welcomed if it ensures
might and unity for his mother country— these are the ideas which have reconciled men
to the numerous reprehensible and lawless theories o f the great Florentine.^'*

Many of Treitschke’s later writings revealed his intellectual debt to the Italian statesman,
for this type of Machiavellian realism constituted a dominant aspect of his political
worldview.
In 1857 Treitschke defended his doctoral dissertation at Leipzig. In it he attacked
a growing trend among German academics, namely the notion that state and society
represented completely separate entities that acted independently of each other and thus
should be studied independently o f one another. Treitschke, by contrast, recognized a
limited but necessary relationship between state and society. He argued that “[sjociety
Davis, 6.
Treitschke, Letter from Gottingen, March 4, 1856. Max Cornelius (ed.), Heinrich von Treitschke’s
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has unbounded claims upon the allegiance of the individual,” explains Davis, “but the
State is only needed for definite and circumscribed objects, and has only to be obeyed in
so far as the interests of society demand such obedience.”^^ The successful dissertation
revealed the influence of Roscher upon the young historian. Whereas Roscher had
argued that every state had to have its own economic system, Treitschke suggested that
“every nation must have its own peculiar form of State.”^^
The favorable reception of Treitschke’s dissertation secured him a lecture post at
Leipzig, where he earned the nickname “Apostle of Prussia.”^^ It was at this point that
Treitschke got the first impulse to write his German History. Originally, he only planned
to write a history o f the Germanic Confederation, based only on existing printed sources
and intended as an “indictment” of the Bund, illuminating its political shortcomings.^*
Before long, though, Treitschke had decided to expand his project in order to capture the
complete essence of his nation’s past. “The kernel of the subject,” explained Treitsehke,
“is not to be found in the Congresses and the negotiations of the Estates, but in the truly
marvelous development of public opinion, or of the soul of the people or whatever else
you like to call it.”^^
In 1861 Treitschke published his important essay “Die Freiheit," essentially a
review o f John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, in which he attacked the Briton’s utilitarianism
and advocated the need for a strong state. Yet, as Davis has pointed out, although
Treitschke rejected Mill’s particular brand of liberalism, he did maintain a lot of his
liberal inclinations in this essay. “Everything new which the nineteenth century has
Davis, 6-7.
Ibid., 7.
Treitschke quoted in Davis, 19.
Davis, 9.
Treitschke, Briefe 2, no. 332, quoted in Davis, 8.

28

created,” wrote Treitschke, “is the work of liberalism.”^*^ Davis observes that in 1861
“political Liberalism meant first and foremost the idea o f a united Germany.”^'
Treitschke, who desired a national state that could protect liberal ideals, defined political
liberty as “ruling and being ruled at the same time.”^^ He envisioned a reciprocal
relationship between the state and the citizen; the state’s “claim upon the loyalty o f the
citizens is to be absolute because its government is their govemment.”^^
In 1863 the government of Baden appointed Treitsehke to the position of
University Deputy Professor for Political Science in Freiburg, where he leetured on
German history, the history of the Reformation, and other topics.^'* Baden’s government
was strongly pro-Prussian at the time and weleomed the arrival of the outspoken
Prussophile. Some in the south German principality could barely believe that such a
prominent figure would aceept a chair in such a politically unimportant place as Freiburg.
“This is no place for a man like Treitschke,” wrote Karl Mathy, a high-ranking offieial in
Baden’s government, in a letter to the prominent German dramatist Gustav Freytag. “But
since he is interested, we are getting him of course with both hands.”^^ Treitschke, whose
reputation preeeded him, enjoyed great popularity as a lecturer at Freiburg.
While he enjoyed the admiration of his South German students, Treitschke did not
reciproeate their warm sentiments. While lecturing in south Germany, he beeame quickly
disillusioned by the South Germans’ lack of commitment to German unifieation, and
developed in himself a strong distaste for what he called the “abominable South German
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particularism.”^^ The South Germans’ strong regional loyalties and their evident
Prussophobia led Treitschke to doubt the likelihood of the peaceful and voluntary
unification of Germany. He concluded “that our fate will clearly be decided by
conquest.”^^
Political events o f the mid-1860s accelerated Treitschke’s protraeted transition
from the liberal idealism of his youth to the realism and narrow chauvinism of his later
years and convineed him that his growing conservatism was the most effective and
appropriate political stance for the time. Prussia’s wars against Denmark and Austria
represented for Treitschke unquestionable proof of Prussia’s national mission. Her
sweeping victory in the Franco-Prussian War and the consequent founding of the German
Reich seemed to vindicate his spirited calls for a strong Prussian state. In response to the
wars o f unification Treitschke completely abandoned the liberal idealism of his youth and
became one of Prussia’s and Bismarck’s most vocal defenders.
On January 21, 1864, Austrian and Prussian forces invaded Schleswig-Holstein to
oppose the provinces’ official incorporation into the Danish state via the Danish
constitution of 1863.^* The ensuing war against Denmark represented a major influence
in this period of transition in Treitschke’s thought, as he expressed strongly pro-Prussian
political views, calling for the Prussian annexation of Schleswig-Holstein. The Vienna
Peace agreement o f October 30, 1864, represented for Treitschke a great step toward the
goal o f German unification, as it indeed was. In his excitement over this monumental
event, Treitschke proclaimed, “The day will come, when both of the natural allies, the
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Prussian state and the German Volk, will again find each other together.”^^ The victory
over the Danes aroused in Treitschke the belief that the occasion represented the
“wonderful activity o f our history.”^® He continued to call it—in a letter to his father, no
less—“the greatest success that our foreign policy has achieved in fifty years.”^'
The Prussian military victory and Bismarck’s skillful diplomatic maneuvering
further confirmed Treitschke’s belief in the Prussian state’s German mission. Around
this time Treitschke expressed in a private letter his conviction that unification could only
occur under the Prussian crown, and only by war. The letter revealed a sincere
commitment to German unification, as well as the historian’s intellectual abandonment of
the liberalism of his youth and a movement toward the staunch monarchism of his later
years:
There is only one salvation; a single state, a monarchical Germany under the dynasty o f
the Hohenzollem; expulsion o f the princely houses annexation to Prussia [sic]. That is, in
clear and definite words, my programme. Who believes that this can be done peacefully?
But is not the unity o f Germany under the emperor William I an idea which outweighs
100,000 lives? Compared with this idea my life is not worth a farthing.

During the debate over Sehleswig-Holstein, Treitschke softened his opposition to
Bismarck, to whom he had previously felt reluctant to give his full-fledged political
endorsement due to the chancellor’s repressive domestic policies. Evidently, some of
Treitsehke’s earlier liberal idealism still persisted. The Prussian victory over Denmark,
however, eonverted him to unwavering support of the Iron Chaneellor. “W hen.. .the war
of 1864 was over,” writes Headlam,

^ Treitschke, February 14, 1864, quoted in Ulrich Langer, Heinrich von Treitschke: politische Biographie
eines deutschen Nationalisten (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1998), 104.
Treitschke, May 7, 1864, quoted in Langer, 104.
Treitschke, August 14, 1864, in Briefe 2: 339, quoted in Langer, 104.
Treitschke, quoted in Headlam, 733.
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[Treitschke] was first to applaud the policy o f the man who, having by the sword tom
Schleswig-Holstein from the Danes, instead o f helping the re-estahlishment o f the state
under its own dynasty, began the process o f annexation/^

Many German liberals experienced a similar change of heart toward Bismarck.
Dorpalen explains that the liberals “had for some time been suggesting that Bismarck
might find absolution for his sins if they were committed to advance the cause of German
u n i t y . T h e rift in the party left the pro-annexationist camp of Altliberalen standing on
one side o f the debate and the “doetrinary-moral” Progressives on the other.^^ For those
who continued to oppose Bismarck, Treitsehke offered the following condemnation:
“You want the unity of Germany, but you refuse to accept the only means hy which it can
be brought about.”^^
At this time, Treitsehke’s radical conservative views began attracting criticism
from many anti-Bismarckian German liberals, as well as from his own family. The left
liberal Jacob Venedey accused Treitsehke of shameful opportunism, charging that the
historian hoped to gain a much desired appointment to the university at Kiel by
advocating Prussian annexation of Schleswig-Holstein.^^ Eduard von Treitsehke also
expressed distress over his son’s evolving political beliefs and political life. In particular,
the elder Treitsehke complained of his son’s loss of religious devotion and the growing
“secularization” of his life and thought.^* In 1865, Treitschke’s father Eduard continued
to express his displeasure with the intellectual and political course his son had taken,
pinpointing the dominant—and indeed accurate— criticism many historians have since
leveled against Treitsehke:
Headlam, 734.
Dorpalen, Treitschke, 92.
Langer, 112.
Treitschke quoted in Headlam, 724.
Langer, 110.
Ibid., 105.
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It hurts me deeply, that my son lets his inborn sense o f justice be entirely exhausted by
his party fanaticism.. .it has damaged you greatly, that you have presented yourself not as
a writer o f history, but rather as a man o f the party.’®

In an 1865 letter to his father Treitschke provided a rebuttal to such accusations, writing,
“That bloodless objectivity which does not say on which side is the narrator’s heart is the
exact opposite of the true historical sense. Judgment is free, even to the author.”^^ This
statement revealed Treitschke’s commitment to being a “political” historian who could
use and manipulate historical truth to influence present political developments.
Following the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein, Treitschke’s enthusiasm for the
Prussian state grew even more vehement. In an essay titled “The Solution of the
Schleswig-Holstein Question,” Treitschke expressed his strengthening “unitarianism,” a
term that Treitschke used to qualify the high degree of political unity that he desired, in a
phrase that seemed to sum up the entirety of his political thought: “We sacrifice to the
unity of Germany every other political good.”*^
Treitschke’s most acute articulation of this conception of the state appeared in his
1865 essay Bundestaat und Einheitstaat (Federal State and Unitary State), in which he
wrote, “In the first place, the second place and in the third place, the essence of the State
is power.”*^ O f course, the German liberals of 1848, such as Dahlmann, had come to
perceive power as a precursor to, and vehicle for, their liberal aspirations. But they had
seen power as a means to an end, a necessary evil to achieve future good,*^ whereas
Treitschke increasingly demanded state power as a moral end in itself. Meineeke
explains that power is indeed a necessary component of any state, but the essence o f a
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State comprises other qualities such as justice and morality to form a whole “essence.”
“But Treitschke,” he writes,
repeatedly continued to announce that the essence o f the State was nothing else but
power, thereby limiting it and corrupting those countless people who in life’s struggles
hanker after simple pithy maxims, and causing them to overestimate and revere simple
power, and thus see the basic problem o f the state in much cruder terms.

By the mid 1860s Treitschke had made a name for himself as a publicist,
attracting wide readership. His popularity and influence upon the German public are
indicated by an offer from the Prussian minister president in 1866 to employ Treitschke
in the service o f the Prussian state. On the eve of the Seven Weeks’ War, Bismarck
requested the services of Treitsehke as a publicist in an attempt to gamer popular support
for the government, telling the historian that he knew and sensed the “deep currents of the
German spirit.”*^ He even promised the historian access to the Pmssian archives, whieh
must have been an almost irresistible offer. Treitschke declined, however, citing his
opposition to Bismarck’s conservative domestic policies. Apparently, some of
Treitsehke’s earlier liberal convictions still lingered.
If Treitschke still harbored any ambivalence regarding the idea o f the state in
1866, then Prassia’s crushing victory over Austria in the Seven Weeks’ War and the
founding of the North German Confederation certainly solidified the historian’s thought.
Meineeke argues that the events of 1866 marked a cmeial point in the growth of
Treitschke’s philosophy, “fixing his ideas on the State, whieh had hitherto been in
flux.”*^ Langer notes that Treitschke clearly defected from the camp of idealism to
realism during the Prussian war against Austria in 1866. Following Prussia’s resounding

Meineeke, 398-99.
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victory over the Austrians at Koniggratz, Treitschke credited the Prussian monarchy with
the great success.

In “D er Krieg und die Bundesreform” he wrote,

Today history put an end to doctrinary disputes over power and freedom with one blow
It asks little about our theories, it crushes the fool who imagines he masters destiny with
his wishes. The struggle about power dawns, and it would be the pinnacle o f foolishness
if we now rejected the parliament we have longed for, because the single hand that is
strong enough to actualize it, the Prussian crown, offers it to us.**

In July of 1866 he expressed in a letter to his then fiancé, Emma Bodman, his optimism
that a German state united by the Prussian sword was all but inevitable; “A great piece of
bloody work still lies before us, but I have no more doubts about the final outcome.”*^
In 1866, with Prussia’s victory over Austria, Treitschke fully pledged his
allegiance to Bismarck and abandoned his concerns of a proper liberal constitution in
Prussia, putting his full support behind the Iron Chancellor. Even his fiiend Gustav
Freytag referred to the professor as ‘'Bismdrckchen.”^^ “Always mindful of the primacy
of the state,” writes Dorpalen,
he opposed the inclusion o f a Bill o f Rights in the constitution o f the new Prussian-led
North German Confederation, objected to the introduction o f universal manhood
suffrage, and regretted that the Confederation turned out to be less Unitarian than he had
hoped.^'

In addition, Treitschke appealed to the Prussians to annex Saxony, Hanover, and several
of the small German states. These demands of Treitschke signaled a clear and
incontrovertible farewell to his earlier liberal sentiments, as state power and political
unity became the only worthwhile political goals that he could possibly imagine.
This type of realism characterized Treitschke’s thought until the founding of the
Reich in 1871. Langer writes, “The establishment of German unity now justly

Langer, 127.
** Treitschke, “Der Krieg und die Bundesformen,” quoted in Langer, 116-117.
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subordinated all other political o b je c tiv e s.T re itsc h k e was not alone in this conviction.
James Sheehan observes that a host of German liberals, among them Heinrich von Sybel
and Hermann Baumgarten, shared Treitschke’s sentiments. This right-wing faction of the
liberal party’s support for Bismarck was not a sudden rift with its prior position, but
rather the end of a period of transition in their political thought. “[M]ost champions of
Bismarck in the late sixties,” writes Sheehan, “had been persistent exponents of a ‘new
realism’ and had often expressed their willingness to aceept national unity from any
source.”^^
Other German intellectuals at that time shared Treitsehke’s sentiment that power
should trump all other ideals. Gordon Craig writes that “the bulk of the liberal party now
gave up the attempt to reconcile the demands of freedom and the requirements of
power.”^"* He cites Karl Twesten, a moderate, whose comment on the issue sounds as if it
had come straight from Treitsehke’s lips: “No one may be criticized for giving
precedence to the issue of power at this time and maintaining that the issues of freedom
can wait, provided that nothing happens that can permanently prejudice them.”^^
Bismarck’s victory was consolidated with the passing of the Indemnity Bill that absolved
him o f past constitutional violations, whieh had been a sore point for many German
liberals, and established him as a hero in the eyes of those same liberals. Wilhelm
Liebkneeht caustically commented, “the angel of darkness has become the angel of light,
before whom the people lie in dust and adore.”^^

^ Langer, 119James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press,
1978), 123.
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With his now unconditional acceptance of the Prussian state, Treitschke also
began heralding the benefits o f a strong monarchical government, in the process
revealing the genesis of his later Anglophobia. Treitschke’s advocacy of a strong
monarchy as a complementary aspect of his German mission grew ever stronger, as the
house of Hohenzollem became for Treitschke what the house of Medici had been for
Machiavelli. The maxim “/e roi règne mais il ne gouverne pas” struck Treitschke as
wholly unacceptable;^^ he had now deserted his earlier liberal principles and placed his
full allegiance behind the monarchy. Langer writes that for Treitsehke a strong monarchy
presented a guarantee against a potential “tyranny of the majority” and encroaching
socialism.^* Treitschke argued that “because our society is more demoeratic than the
English, that’s why our government must remain in deed and truth monarchic.”^^ His
earlier Anglophilia vanished completely. “In regard to the monarchy,” writes Langer,
“Treitschke ordered the German liberals to no longer try to emulate the English model,
but rather finally to understand that the monarchic attitude was unshakably anchored in
the German nation.” *®*^
After 1866, Treitschke focused all his efforts on the task of German unification.
He became frustrated when Bismarck failed “to arouse the moral energies of the
nation.”^®* The chancellor was a political genius, but he was too much the Realpolitiker
for Treitschke, who regarded German unification as a moral and emotional calling. In an
essay he wrote about the Italian statesman Cavour, for which he was awarded the Italian
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Commander Cross/^^ Treitschke implied that even deception of the people was justified
in pursuit o f a goal as virtuous as national unifieation; “To warm one’s hands over the
smoking ruins o f the Fatherland with the smug self-praise: I never told a lie—this is the
virtue of a monk, not of a man.’’^^^ According to Treitsehke, the “virtuous” goal of
national unification exempted states and statesmen fi-om the moral constraints of ordinary
men.
Although the 1866 war had united the north German states under Prussian
guidance, the south German states such as Bavaria and Württemberg remained
independent of Prussia. It seemed as though a war with France would be necessary to
pull these territories into the Prussian orbit. In his memoirs Bismarck wrote that he had
always believed that “a Franco-German war must take place before the construction o f a
united Germany could be realized.”'®'^ Craig cautions that this statement should not
necessarily be taken at face value since Bismarck never saw a war with France as
“inevitable” and because the chancellor believed that Napoleon III could have been
persuaded to relinquish the south German lands if he was convinced that that was what
the people in those territories wanted.

In any case, war with France was always a

distinct possibility, and indeed war erupted in 1870.
Elated by this turn of events, Treitschke published “What We Demand from
France” in the Preussische Jahrbiicher, in whieh he “combined contempt for the beaten
foe with an unabashed imperialism.”'^^ He called for the armexation of Alsace and
Lorraine, arguing that the territory was “German” and rightly belonged under the control
Hausrath, 54.
Treitschke, Aufsatze 2: 365, quote in Dorpalen, “Heinrich von Treitschke,” 26.
Bismarck quoted in Craig, Germany, 14.
Craig, Germany, 14.
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of the German Empire: “These provinces are ours by right of the sword; and we will rule
them in virtue of a higher right, in virtue of the right of the German nation to prevent the
permanent estrangement from the German Empire of her lost children.”'*^’ Treitschke
argued that by annexing the two French provinces Germany would grow stronger as a
nation, particularly because the region offered promising economic opportunities. The
soil of Alsace-Lorraine “oozes with fertility,” wrote Treitschke, and Germany was “by no
means rich enough to renounce so precious a possession.”*®*
Treitschke was not alone in his enthusiasm for Prussia’s defeat of Napoleon Ill’s
forces. The following year, his friend Gustav Freytag wrote of the war.
There never was a struggle fought for a greater ideal than this; never perhaps did Nemesis
strike down the guilty so violently; never perhaps did any army have such a warmth, such
inspiration, and such a deep poetic sense o f the fact that the dreadful work o f the
battlefields served a higher ethical purpose; never perhaps did the working o f divine
providence in the apportionment o f rewards and punishments seem, in human terms, to
be so just and logical as on this occasion. Hundreds o f thousands perceived this as the
poetry o f the historical process...

On January 18, 1871, Emperor Wilhelm 1 was crowned in the Hall of Mirrors at
Versailles and Treitschke’s dream of a unified German state, including the disputed
provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, under Prussian leadership had been realized.
In spite o f the creation of a German empire, Treitschke was not wholly satisfied
with Bismarck’s efforts at unifying the German nation. The Reich of 1871 did not
possess the political unity that he had wished for. “[QJuite considerable powers were
[indeed] left to the individual states,” explains Craig.**® Education and law enforcement
lay within state jurisdiction, as did the right to collect taxes. Treitschke felt that the
chaneellor had allowed the south German states too much autonomy and that Prussia’s
Treitschke, “Was fordern w ir von Fmnkreich?” in Deutsche Kdmpfe 1, quoted in Davis, 110.
Ibid., 112-113.
Gustav Freytag, as quoted in Craig, Germany, 34-35.
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position in the empire was not strong enough.^** He always hated the special rights of
Bavaria and Württemberg, whieh had even retained certain military rights, and
complained that the empire’s structure was too f e d e r a l i s t . A d o l f Hausrath, a friend of
Treitschke’s, wrote that Treitsehke always remained disappointed in the nation;
The more he disliked the remnants o f particularism in the new Constitution, the less he
was disposed to admire the Germans, who, in his opinion, had forfeited the greatest
reward o f great times by their own individualism.''^

On the heels of the 1871 Reichsgrilndung Treitschke won election to a seat in the
Reichstag as a pro-Bismarckian National Liberal. He served the same constituency, the
district of Kreuznaeh-Simmem near Heidelberg, for his entire parliamentary career,
which lasted until 1884 *^'^ Treitschke’s deafness relegated him to a somewhat unique
role in the Reichstag; “he saw himself raising his voice on special occasions only,”
explains D o r p a l e n . O v e r a l l , Treitschke was severely disappointed with the German
parliament, expressing serious doubts about its ability to affect any legislation.
Interestingly, he also resented Bismarck’s methods of dealing with the Reichstag,
complaining once in a letter to his wife Emma of the “scornful treatment” the body
received from the chancellor.**^
In 1874 Treitschke left Heidelberg for a cherished position at the University of
Berlin, where he remained until his death in 1896. It was there that Treitschke built a
reputation as one o f the most, if not the most, vocal defenders of the German Reich of
1871. His lectures on politics at the university and his seven-volume German History,
published between 1879 and 1894 and discussed in detail below, defined his years in
Dorpalen, “Heinrich von Treitschke,” 28.
Hausrath, 60.
Ibid., 61.
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Berlin. They represented the crystallization of the historian’s thought and reveal the
dramatic shift his political outlook had taken since his youth. The lectures and History
espoused the values o f a powerful state apparatus and lauded the efforts of the
Hohenzollems and Prussia as sincere defenders of all German interests. His lectures and
History established Treitschke as a national hero in the eyes of many Germans.
While in Berlin Treitschke finally shed any remnants of his earlier liberalism.
While his political worldview had become decidedly illiberal by the 1870s, Treitschke
had remained a member of the National Liberals. In July of 1879, however, frustrated
with liberal efforts to check the activities of Bismarck, the fiery historian parted ways
with his former partisans and spent his remaining five years in the Reichstag as an
independent.*^^ Ten years later, in 1889, Treitschke severed his last remaining
connection to the liberalism of his earlier days. On the opening page of the July 1889
issue o f the Preussische Jahrbiicher, the ranks of which he had joined at the journal’s
inception in 1857 and which he had edited since 1866, Treitschke formally “[bade]
farewell to [his] readers,” marking the end of his career with one of Germany’s most
influential political journals. *** The Jahrbiicher had provided a medium for Treitschke to
publish some of his most important treatises. The conservative Treitschke had fallen out
with his younger co-editor, Hans Delbriick, who had once described himself as a
“conservative Social Democrat.”**^ The younger editor had also grown frustrated with
Treitschke’s increasing dogmatism and his combative attitude toward political
opponents.
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Treitschke died in 1896 in Berlin while still trying to eomplete his German
History- In his obituary o f the national historian, Friedrieh Meineeke described
Treitschke as “one o f the mightiest men Germany had ever p r o d u c e d . B y 1896 the
historian had eertainly become a prominent national figure. In his life Treitschke had
witnessed monumental political events in Germany and had been instrumental in
encouraging and procuring popular support for national unification in 1871. In his youth
Treitschke was drawn to liberal idealism with its advocacy o f constitutional and
parliamentary government, but he grew inereasingly committed to the eoneept of a
powerful monarchieal state. Indeed, by the time he moved to Berlin in 1874 Treitschke
had solidified his belief in Germany’s national mission, whieh he presented to the
German people in his lectures and in his German History.

Friedrich Meineeke, “Heinrich von Treitschke,” Historische Zeitschrift 11 (1896), 86-90.
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CHAPTER TWO
TREITSCHKE’S NATIONAL MISSION:
THE GERMAN HISTORY
POLITICS
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I. Introduction
In 1874 Heinrich von Treitschke secured a chair at the University of Berlin and
moved to the German capital, where he lived until his death in 1896. During his years in
Berlin, Treitschke authored his monumental History o f Germany in the Nineteenth
Century, a seven-volume history of his nation that spanned the course of German history
from the days of the Reformation to the eve of the 1848 revolutions. Treitschke hoped
that his history would instill in his countrymen a common national consciousness and an
awareness of their national mission. In the dedicatory preface to the first volume, which
first appeared in 1879, Treitschke proclaimed that his aim was to “awaken in the hearts of
his readers.. .a delight in the fatherland.”^
While in Berlin, Treitschke also made a name for himself by giving his now
notorious lectures on “Politics” at the University. Almost all the literature published on
Treitschke makes at least a cursory reference to the throngs of Germans who turned out
to hear him lecture. These crowds included enrolled students, auditors, and people from
the general public, such as professionals and businessmen.^ Many, hoping to watch the
renowned orator, were turned away disappointed, as Treitschke regularly filled his lecture
hall to capacity. “[Treitschke’s] course on Politics,” writes Andreas Dorpalen,
became something o f an institution, with a ritual o f its own, held before overflow
audiences in the largest auditorium o f Berlin’s university Here thousands o f young men
who were later to attend to the public affairs o f the country, administer its laws, and
educate its young were taught disdain o f commercial occupations.. .and contempt for the
lower classes. Here they were also told o f the inferiority o f Jews and non-Germans, the
ineffectiveness o f parliaments and political parties, and the salutary effects o f war and
aggressiveness.^

* Heinrich von Treitschke, History o f Germany in the Nineteenth Century, translated by Eden and Cedar
Paul, (New York: McBride, Nast & Company, 1915), 1 : vx.
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The content of both the German History and the lectures on politics—compiled
from the notes of Treitschke’s students and published posthumously in 1897 as the twovolume Politics'^—reveals the mature thought of the German nationalist historian. In
these two works Treitschke combined the political beliefs he had developed in earlier
treatises to create a coherent system of thought regarding German national development
and international relations. The historian, viewing relations among states as a quasiDarwinian struggle for survival and dominance, presented a rigidly deterministic
conception of history. Treitschke devoted most of his work to explaining how Prussia
had emerged from this struggle as the defender of “German” interests and the unifier of
the German state.
According to Treitschke the German nation-state owed its current strength and
unity to the complementary forces of the Prussian state and German religious and
intellectual freedom. In the opening pages o f his German History he wrote.
It is to two forces that we owe the restoration o f our declining nation, which since those
days has transformed its life politically and economically, in faith, in art, and in science,
to make that life ever richer and ever wider in its scope: the force o f religious freedom,
and the force o f the Prussian state.^

The historian presented the Hohenzollem monarchy and the Prussian state as the political
forces sincerely committed to German national unity. He devoted the bulk of his history
to discussing the methods by which the Prussian kings and statesmen endeavored to
realize German political unity. Moreover, Treitschke presented the German lands, and
Prussia in particular, as a haven of religious tolerance and free thought at a time when
Rome dominated the consciences of most Europeans. Because of the Hohenzollems’
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commitment to intellectual freedom, they rightly inherited the role of leaders of
civilization.
By developing these two points—religious freedom and the national mission of
the Prussian state—Treitschke provided his audiences with two fundamental aspects of
their national consciousness. First, his interpretation of Prussia as the traditional defender
of German interests assigned to that power the mission of founding a German national
state. Since Prussia had accomplished this mission when Treitschke wrote his history and
delivered his lectures on politics, the political historian delegated to the unified German
state the task of maintaining and enhancing state power. Secondly, Treitschke’s view of
Prussia and Germany as defenders of religious and intellectual freedom designated the
German nation as a chosen people. With Luther’s Reformation Germany became a
Protestant Israel, and Treitschke encouraged the nation to become the leader of humanity.
Lastly, Treitschke’s German History gave his countrymen a final component of
their national consciousness— a common national history. As mentioned above,
Treitschke wanted his history to inspire in his readers “a delight in the fatherland” and in
their common past. In doing so, however, the historian’s national bias often led him to
misinterpret the course o f German history. In his effort to establish a Prussian national
mission and to present Germany as a promised land, Treitschke frequently misinterpreted
the motives of Prussian sovereigns and statesmen.

II. The State
For Treitschke, state power represented the most fundamental and necessary
objective o f any society. Because he perceived society as a collection of competing
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groups each seeking to secure its own interests, Treitschke was convinced that only the
state could stand above this struggle as an impartial mediator. Only the state could
ensure social harmony. “Treitschke did not believe in the possibility of a self-regulating
society,” writes Karl Metz. “The force holding the variety of groups together and thereby
forming such a thing as ‘society’ was political dominance, i.e. the state.”^ As the state
represented the goal of any nation, Treitschke identified the tendency o f nations to
develop into states as the motive force of history.
Treitschke argued that humans carry an innate disposition for government, which
eventually and inevitably leads them to found a state. A “natural” and “inevitable”
product o f human nature, “the State is the people” and each citizen represents a
“fragment of the State.”^ He saw this trend as such a necessary part of human nature that
“the idea of a stateless humanity.. .is without historical warrant.”^ The state represents
the “outward form which a nation has moulded for itself.”^ Not all states are the same,
nor should they be. The peculiar character of every nation determines the character o f its
state, and this in turn shapes the nature of the mission that the nation-state shall pursue.
Treitschke drew from the thought of Machiavelli to support his theory o f the state.
He celebrated the “brilliant” Florentine’s “great idea that the State is Power” and stressed
that “[w]e must never forget our debt to Machiavelli.”'^ He credited Machiavelli with
“[setting] the State upon its own feet” and “[freeing] it from the moral sway of the
Church.” It was Machiavelli who “[said] that the State should only strive towards the

®Karl H. Metz, “The Politics o f Conflict: Heinrich von Treitschke and the Idea o f Realpolitik,” History o f
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’ Treitschke, Politics 1: 3-4.
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goal of its own power.”^* Treitschke condemned those who attacked Machiavelli’s
theory o f the state on moral grounds, such as the Jesuits, whom he portrayed as
hypocrites who “daily practiced” what Machiavelli had preached/^
While Treitschke admired Machiavelli and lauded the realism of the Italian
statesman, he did perceive one shortcoming in the Florentine’s ideal of the state. The
German historian observed that Machiavelli’s theories provided no moral justification for
state power; Treitschke maintained that the state indeed served a moral function. It
represented the highest moral ideal of any people. Treitsehke espoused “the principle
that the State is in itself an ethical force and a high moral good.”*^ As its “highest moral
duty,” the state shall “uphold its power.”^'* Its primary duty is to maintain and increase its
strength, as weakness is “the most disastrous and despicable of crimes, the unforgivable
sin o f politics.”*^
The state must subordinate everything to its own power and will, both internally
and externally. Domestically, Treitschke attacked “[t]he ridiculous idea of the State
subordinate to Personal Rights” and demanded the “[sjteadfast loyalty” o f citizens, as it
was “proof of the healthy condition of a State and a nation.”'^ Treitschke drew the
conclusion that “[ejvery moral judgment of the historian must be based on the hypothesis
of the State as power, constrained to maintain itself as such within and without, and of
man’s highest, noblest destiny being eo-operation in this duty.”*^
Exhibiting an extremely pessimistie view of human nature and convinced that a
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self-regulating society was “just another English illusion,”^* Treitschke asserted that the
state must function as a moralizing and educating force, developing the spiritual and
intellectual qualities of the nation. “The State is a moral community called to positive
labours for the improvement of the human race,” Treitschke wrote, “and its ultimate aim
is to build up real national character through and within itself, for this is the highest moral
duty of nations as well as individuals.”'^ He demanded of the state, “the instrument of
civilization,” “positive labour for the economic and intellectual welfare of its
members.”^" The state should function as a “great institution for the education of the
human race.” For this reason the state should be subject to moral law, but this appeal to
morality drowned in a sea of fiery claims about the unqualified power of the state.^'
Treitschke also found support for his theory of the state in the thought o f Hegel,
whose philosophy seemed to Treitschke to justify a strong, powerful state. Hegel, who
“had the keenest intelligence in political matters” of all German philosophers, had
“regarded the state as the actualization of the moral ideal.”^^ Treitschke celebrated
Hegel’s rejection of “the doctrine of natural rights” and the idea o f contract government
and credited the philosopher with
resurrect[ing] the somewhat hyperbolie conception held by classical antiquity, and an
omnipotence accorded to the state which it had never possessed since the Christian world
had recognized the right o f the individual conscience.^^

Treitschke saw this idea as an appropriate antidote for the German people:
But to this people o f ours, which had so long sought its ideal in an anarchic freedom, the
idolization o f the state could do little harm. Only through an overvaluation o f the state
could the Germans attain to a vigorous sense o f the state.^'*
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At the head o f the strong state prescribed by Treitschke should sit a monarch, not
an elected official or body. He regarded a strong monarchy as the political institution
best suited to governing the national state, and the Hohenzollem monarchy most fit to
lead Germany on her national mission. Treitschke’s enthusiasm for the monarchical state
may have been an effort to legitimize the existing Hohenzollem regime in Germany and
the lack of strong parliamentary and constitutional government, but the vehemence with
which he promoted monarchical government seems to reveal a sincere commitment to
monarchism. For Treitschke, the monarchy represented an impartial mediator that stood
above petty class interests; it could justly and efficiently settle social conflict, ensure
social harmony, and, most importantly, promote national unity.
Treitschke referred to his teacher Dahlmann to strengthen his arguments about the
superiority of monarchical government, paying tribute to his political conception of the
state and monarchical government. In his Politics of 1835 Dahlmann, who had held
“strictly monarchical inclinations,” had successfully “dragged political science from the
charmed circle of the formulas of natural law.”^^ Like Hegel, he rejected the notion of a
social contract. Rather, he saw the state as “an original order, a necessary datum, an asset
of mankind.”^^ For Treitschke, it was Dahlmann who realized that a constitutional state
could indeed “embody a vigorous political life” and who also championed the ideal of
monarchical government.^’ He “termed the monarchy the sole bond of custom in the
world o f German states.”^*
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Treitschke argued that the Prussian form of monarchy was inherently superior to
the British parliamentary system. He chastised Montesquieu for his allegedly false
conception of English government as the realization of the ideal of “the separation of
these three authorities [the legislative, the judicial, and the federative], which must never
be united in a single g r a s p . T h e historian accused the French philosophe of a
“stupendous error” for not recognizing that “the House of Commons both made laws and
controlled the policy of the nation so completely that whoever had its confidence
necessarily became the inspirer of England’s foreign policy.”^®
For Treitschke, the dominance of Parliament in British political life conflicted
with his firm belief in the need for a strong monarchy that could ensure the unity o f the
state: “The essence of the State is its unity, and that State is the best organized in which
these three powers are united in one supreme and independent hand.”^* “[Sjince the State
is primarily power,” he opined, “that State which gathers authority most completely into
the hand of one and there leaves it most independent, approaches most nearly to the
ideal.”^^ Obviously, Britain, with its emphasis on the representative institution of
Parliament, had failed to do this. In Treitschke’s view, “It is an aneient experience that
monarchy presents more perfectly than any other form of government a tangible
expression of political power and national unity.”^^

111.

Prussia and the Hohenzollems

As mentioned above, Treitschke saw the force of the Prussian state as one of the
^ Treitschke, Politics 2: 3-4.
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two fundamental forces working toward German national unity. Only Prussia, he argued,
had been committed to establishing a German national state. Throughout his German
History Treitsehke chronicled the efforts of the Hohenzollem and other Prussian
statesmen to achieve national unity. In doing so he ascribed to Prussia motivations more
in accord with the German national cause than with reality.
Treitsehke found inspiration for his argument about Prussia’s national mission in
the thought of Hegel. Not only did Hegel provide an attractive theory of the state, but he
also helped bolster Treitschke’s claims of a Prussian national mission in Germany. Hegel
had acknowledged the necessity of a “vigorous” state, but he had also recognized “the
abundant civilizing activity which the Prussian state had long been accustomed to display
in practice.” By the 1830s, Hegel, who had opted out of the national movement during
the wars of liberation, approvingly pointed out “what [the Germans] possessed in
Pmssia.” According to Treitschke, Hegel had seen in Prussia “the noblest and most
rational of the German states.”^"^
According to Treitschke, the real resurgence of the Prussian state, and
consequently of Germany, began with the Great Elector, Frederick William of
Brandenburg. “The greatest German of his day,” Frederick William arrived on the
German political scene in order “to inspire the slumbering forces of his state with the
might of his will. Never since that time has the strength of the purposive monarchical
will o f the developing German power known any decline.”^^ In the Elector, Treitschke
saw the personification o f his ideal monarch, a leader who could stand above the
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squabbling masses, justly mediating between interest groups within society. As a
monarch, Frederick William possessed
the two virtues upon which its greatness depends: a bold and far-seeing idealism which
sacrifices the convenience o f to-day to the greatness o f tomorrow; and that strong sense
o f justice which ever constrains self-interest in the service o f the w hole.. .It was only in
the sense o f duty to the crown, in the idea o f the monarchical state, that the mutually
hostile tribes and estates, parties and churches, which were comprised within this
microcosm o f German life, could find protection and peace.^®

In Treitschke’s view, the Elector’s state-building efforts in Brandenburg
threatened the status quo o f the Holy Roman Empire: “its monarchical order threatened
the whole structure o f feudal and theocratic institutions which supported the imperial
crown.”^^ Frederick William planted the seeds o f future German greatness. “At length
Germany had again found one who could extend the empire,” Treitschke wrote. “With
the rise o f Prussia there began the long and bloody task of the liberation o f Germany from
foreign dominion.”^* The work of the Great Elector rekindled a sense of national pride in
Germany such that Treitschke could even equate Brandenburg to ancient Rome.
While tainted by an unbridled glorification of Frederick William and the
Hohenzollems, Treitschke’s account of the efforts of the Great Elector is not entirely
inaccurate. After his ascension to the throne in 1640, the Elector’s efforts were
unquestionably crucial to the formation of the Prussian state. Frederick William made a
conscious break with his diplomatic policy of securing and then violating defensive
alliances by building a Prussian army in order to take a more independent approach to
state security. In a 1653 agreement in which Frederick William granted the Junker
nobility extended powers and privileges in exchange for 530,000 Thalers, the Elector
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secured for himself the means to pay for a reliable standing army, which soon became the
backbone o f the new Prussian state, growing from a few thousand mercenaries in 1640 to
30,000 men by 1688.^^
Treitschke’s portrayal o f the efforts of the Great Elector as pivotal in the genesis
o f the Prussian state is supported by Gordon Craig, who agrees that the work of Frederick
William had “revolutionary political consequences.”^^ However, Treitschke, either
intentionally or accidentally, confused the Great Elector’s efforts at state construction
with an effort at nation building. The historian’s suggestion that the Great Elector’s
efforts revived in Germany “the ancient stout-hearted pride in the fatherland” imposed
too much of Germany’s present political situation onto the past."^* German national
sentiment was not important to the Elector. Nor did he attempt to rally patriotic support
of Brandenburg-Prussia, although he did “[instill] into the rag-bag collection of territories
he inherited the beginnings of a common sense of statehood.”"^^
The Great Elector’s heir, Frederick I, did not receive such hagiographie treatment
from Treitschke. In fact, Treitschke only devoted a couple paragraphs to this first king in
Prussia. Frederick did secure for the Hohenzollem the royal title of “Kings in Prussia” in
exchange for aiding the Habsburgs in the War o f Spanish Succession. Treitschke
acknowledged the significance of this development, but he found few other acts of the
first king praiseworthy. He wrote that Frederick had a “weak spirit” and lacked the
admirable pride in the state that his father had had and his son and grandson would
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share/^ Treitschke did, however, compliment Frederick’s efforts to build universities in
several Prussian cities and to sponsor some spectacular building projects. Treitschke’s
interpretation o f Frederick I was fairly accurate. James Sheehan presents Frederick in a
similar manner, portraying him as a rather decadent ruler “who want[ed] to spend what
the preceding generation had eamed.”'^'*
King Frederick William I, the Great Elector’s grandson, continued the
centralization o f the Prussian state in the eighteenth century. “[Ejven the laws of Stein
and Schamhorst and the reforms of our own days,” wrote Treitschke, “could serve only to
develop and not to destroy the work of the founder.. .[I]t was he who introduced into our
history a new form o f government, the circumscribed national unity of the modem
m o n a r c h y . B u t Frederick William I did not embark on a policy of state construction
for personal advantage; he did not regard the new state
as a mere appenage o f his own house. Rather, in the mind o f the unlettered prince, was
there conceived, clearly and vividly, a notion o f the state that was accordant with the new
doctrine o f natural law: the notion that the state exists for the good o f all, and that the
king is placed at its head to administer with unbiased justice over all the estates o f the
realm, to pursue the public weal regardless o f all private privileges and preferences.'*®

Treitschke presented a fairly accurate view of King Frederick William, although it was
perhaps overly complimentary. In his history o f Prussia, E.J. Feuehtwanger contends that
although the king devoted all his energies to the health of his state, he was “driven by an
unbalanced sense o f mission and duty.”'*^ He was not motivated to act for the sake of his
subjects or the development of the German nation, however. The desire for personal and
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dynastie aggrandizement, as well as his deeply Calvinistie convietions, motivated the

king/"
Frederick William I also instituted administrative reforms that, in Treitsehke’s
opinion, proved vital for Germany’s national development. In addition to the “liability to
taxation” the king also imposed “universal military service and compulsory education,
thus establishing the threefold group of general civic duties by which the people of
Prussia have been trained in an active love of the fatherland.”"^^ As a result of these
efforts, wrote Treitschke, “the road was unconsciously prepared for a strong national
sentiment.”^*’ In this case, at least, the historian recognized that Frederick William had
not consciously sought national unity. Treitschke’s praise of Prussian conscription under
Frederick William comes as no surprise, as he often commented on the instructive ability
of military serviee. Ultimately, the historian concluded that the eivie reforms of the king
created a sense o f unity among the people of several dispersed regions: “the men of
Magdeburg and Pomerania, of the Mark and of Westphalia, were welded together into a
single Prussian people.”^^ These efforts doubtless eontributed to the unity of the Prussian
state, but by suggesting that they were intended to breed German patriotism, Treitsehke
again misrepresented the true motives of the Hohenzollem dynasty.
Treitschke found the epitome of his ideal monarch in Frederick the Great, who
reigned from 1740 to 1786 and once remarked, “My only God is my duty” ^^ Treitschke
welcomed his “pitiless and cruel German realism,” the defining trait of his reign.
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Because o f his selfless devotion to the well being of his subjects, Frederick represented
the model o f a German king. Other countries, like France, had suffered under inferior
monarchs: “The Bourbons never fully emerged from the vain notion of courtly
deification and contempt for mankind, hence their shameful fall.”^"* In contrast,
Treitschke argued that Frederick reawakened among Germans “the monarchical
sentiment which was in our people’s very blood.”^^ The rule of Frederick instilled in the
German people a faith in the monarehy as the one form of government that could fairly
and effectively stand above societal divisions and justly govern the people. “In no other
nation o f modem history was the task of kingship understood in so great and lofty a
sense,” Treitschke wrote, “and for this reason the German people remained.. .the most
monarchieal in sentiment among all the great civilized nations.”^^
In Treitschke’s view, Frederick’s reign truly marked the beginning of Prussia’s
rise and the growth of German national consciousness. O f course, Treitschke had praised
the efforts of all the Hohenzollems, but in the achievements of Frederick Europe traly
witnessed “the formation of a great German power which should defend the fatherland
with the strong hand in the east and in the west.”^^ Under Frederick Pmssia became
strong enough to pursue a genuinely independent policy free fi’om the interference of
Austria, France, Britain, or Sweden. Unlike any of his predecessors, Frederick succeeded
in asserting “a policy that was Prassian, and Pmssian only. To this policy belonged
Germany’s future.”^* To aecount for Frederick’s lack of tme patriotic enthusiasm,
Treitschke argued that he possessed a silent, almost divine, dedication to the German
Ibid., 84.
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cause. “It was not the way of this hater of phrases to talk much of the fatherland,” wrote
Treitschke, “and yet his soul was animated by a vigorous national pride.”^^
Treitschke presented Frederick’s great military victories, such as his conquest o f
Silesia, as victories for the cause of German national unity. While the king’s military
efforts certainly challenged Austrian hegemony in Central Europe, Treitschke’s
assertions that the king’s conquest of Silesia was “a genuinely German deed” and that
“his soul was animated by a vigorous national pride” blatantly misinterpreted the motives
of the king. Frederick’s designs on Silesia stemmed from a desire for personal, not
national, g l o r y . A t the beginning of the second Silesian War in 1744, Frederiek did
indeed try to rally imperial opinion against Austria and even suggested the formation of
an imperial army under the command of the Bavarian Emperor Charles Vll to oppose the
Austrians, but this was by no means an effort to cultivate German patriotism.^*
Feuchtwanger concedes that Prussia’s victorious emergence from the Seven
Years’ War did arouse “the first faint stirrings of national sentiment,” and says that a
patriotic attitude did begin to emerge under Frederick, but these sentiments centered not
on the abstract idea of a German nation, but rather on the heroic figure of Frederick.
“Neither [the Great Elector nor Frederick the Great] felt conscious of any German
mission,” writes Dorpalen, “nor did anyone else in their time.”^^ In fact, Dorpalen
reiterates the position o f Franz Schnabel, who says that Frederiek 11’s policies
represented a “revolt against the German unity embodied in the empire.”^^ Moreover,
despite his popularity, Frederick failed to win popular support for his state. The
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Frederician state consisted o f a mass of automatons who felt little patriotic attachment to
Prussia and expressed little remorse when Napoleon crushed the Hohenzollem forces at
Jena in 1806.^^
Following Prussia’s defeat at Jena, the task of advancing Prussia’s—and
Germany’s—national mission was assumed hy a set of Prussian statesmen who instituted
a series of reforms in an effort to modernize the Prussian state. These men worked to
reinvigorate the Prussian state in the midst of Napoleon’s domination, and their reforms
laid the foundation for the German Reich of 1871. “In this time of sorrow and selfknowledge,” wrote Treitschke, “were first formed all the political ideals for whose
realization the German nation is working to this day.”^^ These reforms were indeed vital
to Prussia’s resurgence after years of Napoleonic domination, and for the first time the
Pmssian state genuinely sought to generate patriotic sentiment in Germany. The Pmssian
reformers— among them Stein, Schamhorst, and Gneisenau— consciously attempted to
replace the “mechanistic” Frederician state with a more organic state to which Germans
would feel bound hy a strong sense of duty. The reformers wanted a citizenry morally
committed to its state, envisioning the reformed state as a moral institution; “they
demanded from the rejuvenated German state that it should protect religion, art, and
science, all the ideal aims o f the human race.”^^
In his analysis of the reform era, Treitschke emphasized the work of Heinrich von
Stein, “the pioneer of the age of reform.”^^ Appointed minister o f foreign and domestic
affairs in 1807, Stein, a non-Pmssian hailing from Nassau, held a deep conviction and
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commitment to the ideal o f German unity, a conviction that “was instilled in the cradle
into this proud lord.”^* Treitschke maintained that Stein’s political convictions derived
from a “powerful moral idealism” fostered “by the hard school of the Prussian official
s e r v i c e . S t e i n ’s monarchist sentiments appealed to Treitschke, as did Stein’s “Prussian
sense of duty,” which the baron opposed to the “greedy [French] revolutionary sentiment,
whieh demanded from the state unending human rights.”’® Treitschke found the work of
Stein invaluable to the development of the German nation: “Every advance in our
political life has brought the nation back to Stein’s ideals.”’* Stein “undertook.. .the
completion of the unity of the state.”’^ He created ministerial offices for the departments
o f “home affairs, finanee, foreign affairs, war, and justice,”’^ eentralizing the Prussian
state and making it a more efficient governing apparatus.
In 1807, King Frederick William III entrusted General Gerhard von Schamhorst
with the task of reorganizing the army. Treitschke noted that the king saw in the army a
useful apparatus for the education of the nation and “[he] impressed it upon the officers
that they should never cease to realize their honourable position as educators and teachers
of a noteworthy portion o f the nation.”’^ Treitschke himself was very attraeted to the
notion of the army as a sort o f “school of the nation,” a theme evident throughout many
of his writings. For Treitschke, the army reforms greatly contributed to the growth of
German patriotism: “The fundamental idea of all these reforms was that heneeforward
the army was to consist o f the people in arms, it was to be a national army, to which
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everyone capable of bearing arms must belong.”^^ These reforms helped to affect what
Schamhorst called “the intimate union of the army with the nation.”^^ Treitschke, who
associated the reforms of the army with the birth of national consciousness, quoted
Schamhorst approvingly:
The sense o f independence must be instilled into the nation, which must be given an
opportunity o f becoming acquainted with itself, and learn how to gain respect from
others. All that we can do is work towards this end. We must loosen the bonds o f
prejudice, guide the rebirth o f the nation; care for its growth, and not hinder its free
development; more than it is not in our power to do.’^

In his effort to glorify the Hohenzollem monarchy Treitschke credited Frederick
William III with the initiation of the military reforms, asserting that the king “gave the
first impetus” for the reorganization of the army/^ Treitschke’s praise may have been
misplaced. Gordon Craig points out that the king looked upon Schamhorst’s plans for a
national militia “with disfavour from the very first.”^^ So, while Frederick William III
certainly played an important role in approving the military reforms, he cannot really be
credited for their content or success.
Treitschke’s contention that the army reformers sought to build a tmly “national”
army that could rally the sentiment of the nation accurately interpreted the motives of the
reformers. Stein once remarked that a combination of a standing army and a national
militia could successfully “inculcate a proud warlike national character” upon society.
Hermann von Boyen, a Prassian commander, remarked that a national army would
constitute a “school of the nation.”** Another, August Gneisenau wanted to “awaken”
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the energies “asleep in the bosom of the nation.”*^
Treitschke argued that the Prussian reformers sought to form a state radically
different from that o f the French, who “pursued a tendency of secondary importance,
directed to the simple manifestation of power.”*^ Greatly influenced by Edmund Burke,
the conservative Stein despised the French Revolution for its destruction of the
monarchy.*'^ He and the other reformers envisioned a German state that would “protect
religion, art, and science, all the ideal aims of the human race, for their own sake.”^^
Treitschke cited another key figure of the army reforms. General August Gneisenau, who
once proclaimed, “First make the human race enthusiasts for duty, and only after that for
rights!”*^ For Treitschke, all o f the Prussian reforms were inherently superior to the
violent transition of the French Revolution: “From the first, the Prussian officers
conceived the ideas o f universal military service in a freer and juster sense than did the
bourgeoisie under the Freneh Direetory.”^^
Treitschke’s interpretation of the reform period is in many ways accurate. Yet his
insistence that men like Stein, Schamhorst, and Gneisenau sought to mould a state
fundamentally different from that of France falsely represented their motives. While they
wished to avoid a violent revolution, they modeled their reform program on the political
and social reforms they witnessed in France and “sought to adapt many o f [the French]
reforms for the strengthening of their own country.”** Koppel Pinson observes that Stein,
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Schamhorst, and especially Karl August von Hardenberg, wanted to integrate
revolutionary ideals into the Prussian monarchical system.*^ The reforms did have, as
Treitschke suggested, the ultimate effect of invigorating German national consciousness.
“It was during these days o f convulsive excitement,” wrote Treitschke approvingly, “that
there first awakened in North Germany the idea of German unity.”^^
Finally, with the benefit o f hindsight, Treitschke presented Pmssian efforts to
ereate a German Customs Union as vital to the development of the German national state.
Since Austria’s influence in the Bund deterred Pmssia from taking political steps toward
unity, Pmssian statesmen, particularly F.C.A. Motz, pursued the national mission by
economic means, a tactic to which the Austrians were completely oblivious. O f Motz,
appointed minister of finance by Frederick William, Treitschke wrote that he held
“[mjeasureless.. contempt for the petty courts,” viewed himself as “a pioneer of German
civilization,” and “lived entirely for the state.”^* The historian credited Motz with
consciously initiating the proeess of Germany’s revolt from Austria:
At a time when the official German world regarded the perpetual league between Austria
and Prussia as an inviolable law, [Motz] marched unhesitatingly towards the attainment
o f another end, the permanent union, o f all Germany, Austria excluded, by the
indestructible bond o f economic interests.®^

Treitschke portrayed New Year’s Day 1834— the day the Customs Union officially came
into being—as a national festival with jubilant crowds gathered at toll booths. He even
wrote that “from a remote distanee eould already be heard the guns of Koniggratz,”^^ a
phrase that reduced the significance of the event to a “pathetic cliché,” in the words of
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one historian.^"^
Treitschke clearly saw— or at least sought to portray—the Customs Union as a
crucial development in Germany’s struggle for unity, and he did not miss the opportunity
to praise the Hohenzollem for its role in the accomplishment. While he lauded the efforts
of Motz and other statesmen such as J.A.F. Eichhom and Karl Georg Maassen, who
played a pivotal role in establishing the Zollverein, he claimed that their efforts would
have come to naught had it not been for the work of King Frederick William. “The
unpretentious simplicity o f his nature,” explained Treitschke, “enabled him...to sow the
seed [5ic] of a great future.”^^
In his interpretation of the Zollverein, Treitschke again misrepresented the true
motives of the Prussian state, an error that, as James J. Sheehan observes, many historians
o f Wilhelmine Germany committed. Wilhelm Roscher, one of Treitschke’s former
mentors, once called the Customs Union “not only the most beneficial, but also the
greatest event in German history between Waterloo and Koniggratz.”^^ Sheehan
describes the Zollverein as “perhaps the period’s most famous bureaucratic
accomplishment,” but maintains that it “was essentially a fiscal measure.”^^ In reality,
the Zollverein played little or no role in encouraging German political unity: “In
retrospect, of course, the Zollverein seemed to fit perfectly into the story of Prussia’s
‘national mission’ to unify Germany. Actually, the tariff union had little to do with the
nation..

In fact, Sheehan even doubts the economic benefits of the Union, noting that
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uniform system of weights and measures, and that international influences continued to
affect the domestic economies of the German s t a t e s . D a v i d Blackboum agrees that “it
is important to recognize that the customs union was a product of Prussian geographical
division and fiscal interests, not part of a long-term ‘German’ programme.”*®®

IV. Religious Freedom
In addition to the centralizing and unifying force of the Prussian state and the
Hohenzollems, Treitschke also identified religious freedom as the second important
aspect o f her national mission. He presented the German Reformation as a rebellion
against the intellectual and spiritual imperialism of Catholicism, supported by Rome and
the Habsburgs. The national historian saw Pmssia, writ large as the German nation, as a
chosen land; the Germans had become God’s chosen people. Because of this tradition of
religious tolerance and intellectual liberty, argued Treitschke, Germany rightly deserved
to occupy a position o f world hegemony and become the next leader of civilization.
Germany tmly realized her national mission during the Reformation. Treitschke
portrayed Martin Luther as the great savior not only of the Germans, but also of all
humanity. The effect of Luther’s reform was to fi-ee “the State from the dominion of the
Church.” Treitschke wrote that “the nation hailed the Monk of Wittenberg with shouts of
exultation, and, moved to the depths of its being, awaited an entire transformation of the
empire.”*®* Luther became a tme national hero as a cmsader for spiritual and intellectual
freedom. Treitschke portrayed “the free movement of ideas” as the defining trait of the
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German nation. It was the “holy of holies of the nation of Martin Luther.”'*^^
While perhaps a bit exaggerated, Treitschke’s suggestion that the German
Reformation was partly a national movement is not entirely false. Luther did gather
many supporters, and Hajo Holbom has acknowledged that “national sentiment was a
subordinate element in Luther’s opposition to Rome.”'°^ Moreover, most of the German
estates were opposed to papal authority and the imperial diet in Augsburg “had shown
passionate aversion to Rome.”'^"^
Not only had Luther’s attack on the Church resulted in a break between Germany
and Rome, but it also marked the beginning of an Austro-Prussian and, for Treitschke, an
Austro-“German” antagonism, even though many South Germans remained Catholic
during the Reformation. The empire of the Habsburgs, whieh remained Catholic, would
“[remain] henceforward, until its inglorious fall, the enemy of all that was traly
German.”^®^ Throughout the rest of his seven-volume history Treitsehke presented
Austria and the Habsburgs as the historical enemy of all German interests, which were
untiringly defended by the Prassian state and the Hohenzollem crown. In Treitsehke’s
opinion “Austria did nothing for Germany, while Prussia alone was in a position to do
justice to the longings of the nation.”*®^ Treitschke likely portrayed Austria as a
traditional enemy o f “Germany” in order to legitimize the kleindeutsch unification o f the
empire in 1871. To account for the fact that a large population of German-speaking
Austrians lay outside the Kaiserreich, Treitsehke suggested that they were historical
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enemies of Germany, an assertion based in part on their loyalty to the Catholic Church.
The Thirty Years’ War, or the “war o f the religions”, as Treitschke called it,
represented another landmark in Germany’s national mission, as it was this catastrophe
that alerted Germans to the above-mentioned fundamental forces that built their nation:
religious freedom and the Prussian state. “In a disturbance without parallel, the old
Germany passed away,” Treitschke wrote. “Those who had once aimed at worlddominion were now, by the pitiless justice of history, placed under the feet of the
stranger.” All the lands of Germany became the “captives of foreign nations.. .Never was
any other nation so forcibly estranged from itself and from its own past.”'®^ It appeared
as though the religious wars signaled “the destruction o f the German name.”
Miraculously, though, “[I]n those days of misery, in the time of the Peace of Westphalia,
our new history begins.”*®*
In the midst of religious upheaval and warfare, Prussia emerged as the guardian of
religious freedom. Because the German lands contained Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists,
and Jews, the Hohenzollems had to defend all four. “Thus originated,” wrote Treitschke,
the peculiar duplex attitude o f the Hohenzollems towards our ecclesiastical life: with the
fall o f the power o f the Palatinate they became the leaders o f militant Protestantism in the
empire, but had also to represent the fundamental idea o f the new German civilization—
freedom o f religious belief.'”®

Prussian monarchs, such as the Great Elector, Frederick I, and Frederick the Great, did
indeed champion the ideals o f religious tolerance, yet Treitschke’s celebration of Prussia
as a religious haven may have been intended to serve more eontemporary objeetives. In a
state containing Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Jews, Treitsehke did not wish to
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alienate any group from the national cause. The only way to bring these disparate groups
together was through an emphasis on tolerance and “freedom of religious belief.”
Treitschke portrayed the Great Elector as a champion of Germany’s mission and
the guardian of spiritual freedom. The Prussia of Frederick William was “the first state in
Europe in which complete religious freedom was secured.. .in Brandenburg the throne
stood free above all the Churches and protected their equality.”''*’ In fact, according to
Treitschke, Prussia offered asylum for religious refugees from across the continent and
became a magnet for persecuted peoples. When Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes,
the Elector responded with his own Edict of Potsdam, which “offered protection and
shelter to the children o f the martyr-Church.”" ' Frederick William also granted religious
freedom to Jews, who traveled to Brandenburg from Vienna, while Protestants flocked
from Heidelberg.
Treitschke’s portrayal of Frederick William as a defender of Protestantism and of
religious freedom is also accurate. The Elector’s Calvinism certainly motivated him to
strengthen his state, as he recognized a need for a strong Protestant German state to
ensure the future o f the faith.

His devotion to the Calvinist faith also prompted

Frederick William to offer shelter to his French co-religionists. In 1685 he issued his
Edict of Potsdam, which inspired the widespread immigration of French Huguenots into
Brandenburg. As a Calvinist in a Lutheran land, the Elector likely also saw this
maneuver as a means of bolstering political support in his territory. In 1671 he also lifted
restrictions on Jews in Brandenburg."^
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Frederick the Great also stood as a crusader against “Roman” tyranny in
Treitschke’s eyes. The historian suggested that Prussia’s victory in the Seven Years’ War
represented the greatest blow to the Roman church since the heresy of Martin Luther. To
him Frederick was like Luther—a crusader for the well being of humanity. “King
Frederick had in truth,” wrote Treitschke, “been fighting for the freedom of the human
race.”**'* Treitschke lauded Frederick’s conquest of Silesia, a predominantly Catholic
region, in the War of the Austrian Succession as “a genuinely German deed,” rather than
the power-based political move that it really was. The region’s prosperity after the
Prussian conquest apparently confirmed “that the new province had found its natural
master.”' P r u s s i a ’s victorious emergence from the Seven Years’ War proved the
“irrevocable necessity” o f “the new order o f German affairs, whieh had begun with the
foundation of the Prussian power.”

V.

The Struggle of Nations

In addition to his efforts to establish the national mission o f the Prussian state as
the defender o f German interests and a leader of humanity, Treitschke’s German History
reflected its author’s conception of international relations, which he perceived as a quasiDarwinian struggle among nation-states. Many scholars have labeled Treitschke a social
Darwinist, but Paul Crook smartly observes that Treitschke’s theory of international
relations should not be interpreted as Darwinian “solely by virtue of the fact that [his]
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bellicose utterances succeeded the publication of Darwin’s Origin

Mike Hawkins

further explains that Treitschke’s doctrine o f Machtpolitik ~was not really Darwinian
because Treitschke did not provide a “materialist rationale for power politics,” as
Bemhardi and others did after him.'** In other words, Treitschke’s work was not
Darwinian because for him the struggle among nations was a struggle for prestige, for
what he called the right to lead civilization, rather than a struggle for resources necessary
for national survival.
Within this struggle, vigorous nations rose to positions of regional and global
dominance while weaker nations declined. During the late 1800s, Treitschke portrayed
Great Britain and her overseas empire as the hegemonic power in the world. He also
portrayed Austria as the hegemonic power in Central Europe and France, for a short time
at least, as the hegemon in Europe. The story o f his German History is in large part the
story of Prussia’s struggle against these three imperialist powers. The German History
worked to expose the alleged tyranny of these hostile powers and celebrated Prussian
efforts to throw off the yokes of France and Austria and to challenge Great Britain’s
global position. In both his lectures and his History Treitschke encouraged his fellow
Germans to take up the national cause and bring Germany to a position of world
hegemony through colonial expansion overseas. The whole future of the nation, he
argued, depended on it. This type of imperial expansion would almost certainly entail
war with other imperialist nations, something that Treitschke celebrated for its ability to
unite peoples and strengthen nations.
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Revolutionary and Napoleonic France represented for Treitschke one of the most
detrimental forces acting against the goal of German national unity. Most unfortunate in
Treitschke’s view was the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine in July of 1806,
when “[sjixteen German princes separated themselves from the empire, declared
themselves to be sovereign, and further declared that every law of the ancient and
honorable national comity was null and inoperative.” Furthermore, “they recognized
Napoleon as their protector” and pledged military support for France in the case of
war.**^ Designed by Napoleon “as a counterweight to Prussia and Austria,”*^®the
Confederation represented for Treitschke a tragic development in the history of the
German nation. With the founding of the Rhenish Confederation, the old Holy Roman
Empire and the unity it embodied ceased to exist.
Treitschke was extremely suspicious of the French desire to spread revolutionary
republican ideals throughout the continent and even the world: “the French now regarded
themselves as the Messiahs of freedom.”*^’ He lamented that the French saw themselves
as cultural leaders and noted that General Lafayette prophesied “that the [new tricolor]
should wave round the world.”*^^ As mentioned above, Treitschke worked to discredit
the violent upheaval of the French Revolution and the reforms that it entailed. French
hegemony in Germany threatened to destroy the Prussian monarchical order.
Fortunately, however, “Frederick William was not inclined to allow the prestige of his
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crown to be endangered.”^^^ The reforms of Stein and his other ministers effectively
rejuvenated the Prussian state, enabling it to defeat Napoleon’s forces in 1813.
France’s defeat in the Wars of Liberation and Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo
did not, however, eliminate the French threat to Germany Treitschke remained hostile to
France for the rest of his life. As late as 1870, in his pamphlet entitled “What We
Demand of France,” he promoted the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine and advocated
harsh peace terms for the Freneh following that country’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian
War. In his Politics he deelared that Germany was involved in a “latent” war with
Franee, even though the two powers were “outwardly fiiendly.”*^"^ In his History
Treitschke had written that “[t]he [French] nation was accustomed to despise every
foreign power.”'^^ Treitschke almost certainly sought to portray the French as inherently
xenophobic and hostile, a characteristic he believed to be no less true in 1896 than it was
in 1806.
After the expulsion o f the French from Germany in 1813, the Habsburg Empire
stood as the greatest obstacle to German national unity. In the opening pages of the
German History, Treitschke railed against the Habsburgs, who had supposedly exploited
their favorable position within the Holy Roman Empire to dominate all of Germany.
“For our people,” he wrote, “the imperial rule of the Hapsburgs was a foreign
dominion.”’^^ In his biography of Treitschke, Andreas Dorpalen has pointed out the
inaccuracy of such a statement; “it was an entirely unhistoric view to deseribe the
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Habsburg phase o f the Holy Roman Empire as one of alien rule in German eyes.”*^^
Treitschke made other efforts to alienate Austria from the greater cultural and
geographical Germany; in the opening pages of the German History he argued that since
the Peace o f Westphalia “Austria has remained apart from the community o f German
life."'^^

For Treitschke, the Congress of Vienna and the subsequent meetings of the
European concert represented a conspiracy of the Great Powers to thwart German
national unity and foil the aspirations of Prussia. According to Treitschke, the Prussian
representatives at the Congress o f Vienna were committed to promoting their state’s
mission as the defender and unifier o f the German nation. “To them,” wrote Treitschke,
“the national political development was a matter in which they put their whole hearts.”*^^
Their efforts came to naught, however, in the face of the opposition of the other European
powers. In fact, Treitschke went so far as to say that at Vienna “the whole world was
united in fighting Prussia.”*^®
Treitschke’s chief villain in this story was Austrian foreign minister Clemens von
Mettemieh. The historian demonized Mettemich, “the Adonis of the drawing rooms,”^^*
for his German policy that aimed at keeping the German states in political disunity and
subordinate to Habsburg dominance. He was Prussia and Germany’s arch nemesis, a
man who worked to ensure “[a] persistent state of disintegration in Germany, so that the
sovereign petty kings should voluntarily turn to Austria for protection against Prussia and
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against ‘the dangerous idea of German u n i t y . T r e i t s e h k e remarked that this poliey
“had no inkling o f the motive forees of history,” revealing his convietion that nations
naturally evolve into states with young and vibrant nations rising to challenge old and
decaying ones.

Mettemich was joined in his opposition to German unity by the

Habsburg Emperor Francis, “the sworn enemy of all innovations, the suspicious opponent
of the two ambitious neighbor powers, Russia and, above all, Pmssia.”*'’'^ Treitschke’s
arguments about the Austrians’ efforts to squash the German national movement are
probably not inaccurate. However, Treitsehke’s vehemence toward Francis and
especially toward Mettemich, whom he called the “vainest of men,”^^^ certainly
discredited their accuracy.
One of Mettemich’s greatest triumphs in opposing German national development
was the Federal Act o f 1815, which established the German Confederation. Intended to
replace the old Empire, the Confederation, or Bund, represented a loose alliance of
German states, including Austria and Prassia, who competed for influence within it.
Those who had wanted greater German political unity at the time were greatly
disappointed with the Confederation because it ensured a significant degree of
sovereignty for the individual states within it. According to Treitsehke, Mettemich saw
the Confederation as “the most suitable means for effectively checking Pmssian
ambition!

The Federal Act of June 8, 1815, which recognized the “independence and

inviolability of the individual German states,” was a “catastrophe” and ensured “the
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triumph of particularism” in Germany/
Political developments that Treitschke witnessed during his own life also greatly
influenced his scholarly bias. After the Reichsgrilnding, the historian increasingly saw
Britain as Germany’s chief rival in fulfilling her national mission. Britain had enjoyed
her tenure as the dominant world power, now it was the young and vigorous Germany’s
turn to assert herself on the international stage. Treitschke hurled many of his harshest
criticisms at the British, whom he portrayed as crass, materialistic Mammon worshipers;
The hypocritical Englishman, with the Bible in one hand and a pipe o f opium in the other,
possesses no redeeming qualities. The nation was an ancient robber-knight, in full armor,
lance in hand, on every one o f the world’s trade routes.. .The English possess a
commercial spirit, a love o f money which has killed every sentiment o f honor and every
distinction o f right and wrong. English cowardice and sensuality are hidden behind
unctuous, theological fine talk which is to us free-thinking German heretics among all the
sins o f English nature the most repugnant. In England all notions o f honor and class
prejudices vanish before the power o f money, whereas the German nobility has remained
poor but chivalrous.*^*

Treitschke reserved some of his harshest words for British statesmen such as Castlereagh
and Canning. The Britons at Vienna, he wrote, were “crotchety” and possessed a
“preposterous arrogance.” He described Lady Castlereagh as “gigantic.”^^^
Treitschke interpreted Great Britain’s policy as opportunistic and imperialistic
and maintained that English statesmen had intentionally played the continental powers
off against one another in order to build their own world empire with minimal European
competition. In his discussion o f Canning’s policies, Treitschke noted that
British commerce would thrive most securely if the continent were never at rest, if the
economic energies o f the nations o f Europe were paralysed by civil wars; then the
fortunate island nation could consolidate undisturbed that dominion over the seas which
she regarded as her natural heritage.

137

Federal Act quoted in Holbom 2: 445; and Treitschke, German History 2; 125.
Treitschke quoted in Louis L. Snyder (ed.), Documents o f German History (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 1958), 262.
Treitschke, German History 2: 13.
Treitschke, German History 4:15.

75

Treitschke traced this attitude toward continental affairs back to the Pitts, who “had
employed the high-sounding phrase of the European balance of power as an oratorical
wrapping for the concealment o f their policy which aimed at England’s command of the

sea.”'"'
England’s position as Europe’s dominant maritime power represented for
Treitschke not merely a position of strength but also one of tyranny. Treitschke, who
described British maritime policy as that of “privileged rapine,” wrote that an
international balance of power “was not secure, so long as one single state could act upon
all the seas in accordance with her own arbitrary caprice.”*'*^ At the peace negotiations
following Napoleon’s defeat, both Russia and Prussia campaigned for “the principles o f a
humane sea power which could not be oppressive to neutral trade,” but Great Britain
opposed their efforts because she felt “that this would threaten the very basis of her
power.”*"^^ Ultimately, the continental powers’ preoccupation with more pressing
problems meant that “the foulest spot of modem international law was not touched upon
during the peace negotiations o f Chatillon, Paris, and Vienna.”*'^'* This conclusion of the
debate about maritime law represented for Treitschke yet another example of Britain
exploiting her insular position to protect her own interests and world empire.
Treitschke’s treatment o f George Canning, appointed foreign secretary upon
Castlereagh’s death in 1822, serves as another telling example o f his interpretation of
British policy in general. According to Treitschke, Canning continued Britain’s singleminded policy of securing commercial gains; with his appointment to office “a resolute
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representative of English interests and English commercial poliey once again acquired a
predominant influence in Downing Street.” “From his youth upwards,” wrote Treitschke,
“Canning had lived solely for the idea of England’s power.”^"^^ The historian argued that
Canning, rather than recognizing the French Revolution as a profound ideological
struggle, saw it only as “a contest for the British mastery of the sea.”'"^^ In order to cover
up his true commercial aims. Canning often appealed to the liberal and national
aspirations of continental Europeans:
The fine phrases about national freedom introduced into his speeches were to serve only
as a means by which the approval o f public opinion on the continent was to be won on
behalf o f the harsh commercial policy o f England.*'*’

Treitschke’s Anglophobia skewed his history to such an extent that he even
attempted to portray the British abolition of the slave trade as an attempt to expand
British commercial interests. He wrote that British statesmen supported abolition “with
an ardour that was altogether too conspicuous, while the British commercial world used
language of almost fanatical vehemence against the slave traders.”*'** Treitschke
attempted to account for this alleged enthusiasm with an explanation of the trade in
coffee. He noted that “barely one-twentieth” of all coffee imports came from English
possessions and that British colonies already “had long been overstocked with blacks.”*'*^
For those reasons, the cessation of the slave trade could do little harm to British
commerce, but “it would inevitably give rise to severe economic disturbances in the
colonies o f the other naval powers.”*^® Treitschke concluded that all the “flne talk of
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Christian brotherly love” simply masked the true aims of British policy—namely,
commercial interests. *^^
In order to challenge Britain’s world hegemony, Treitschke advocated a vigorous
policy o f colonial expansion. He conceded that Germany had missed a great opportunity
for colonization, as much of the globe had already been claimed by the British: “The
consequences of the last half century have been appalling, for in them England has
conquered the world.”^^^ In light of this development, Treitschke viewed colonial
expansion as absolutely necessary to the future of the German nation, writing that “the
whole position of Germany depends upon the number o f German-speaking millions in the
future.”^^^ He proclaimed that “all great nations” have pursued an impulse “to set their
mark upon barbarian lands.” Furthermore, “The colonizing impulse has become a vital
question for a great nation.”^^^ Treitschke passionately encouraged Germany to take her
rightful place among the great colonizing nations of the world:
every colonizing effort which retains its single nationality has become a factor o f
immense importance for the future o f the world. Upon it depends the share which each
people will take in the domination o f the earth by the white races.

Such a policy o f imperial expansion would almost surely lead any nation into war,
a risk that Treitschke welcomed. He accepted and even celebrated the fact that
international relations, when perceived as a continuous struggle of nations, necessarily
entailed wars among states. While he argued that the political and military reforms of
men such as Frederick and Stein had made great contributions to German national unity
and the growth of a common national sentiment, Treitschke strongly believed that war
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had even greater ability to unite a people. For that reason, Treitschke celebrated the
experience of war throughout his works.
The national historian insisted that states and nations built and strengthened
themselves through conflict. Throughout history conflict had worked to unite nations.
This trend could be traced back to ancient tribal peoples, among whom “[t]he gregarious
instinct.. .was strengthened as much by the impulse of hostility to the alien as by the other
impulse of adherence to the tribe to which a man belonged.”^^^ Treitschke untiringly
argued that war benefited states and nations: “it is war which turns a people into a
nation."^

In his Politics the nationalist historian wrote, “We leam from history that

nothing knits a nation more closely together than w ar.. .War and conquest, then, are the
most important factors in state construction.” '^^ War functions as “the one remedy for an
ailing nation.”'^^ Treitschke shamelessly celebrated the “grandeur of war,” which
“[annihilates].. .puny man in the great conception of the State.”'^"
In his analysis of the Prussian Wars of Liberation against Napoleon’s forces,
Treitschke revealed his view of war as a constructive force in the nation-building process.
The historian celebrated the work of General Gebhart Blücher, who commanded Prussian
forces at the Battle o f Katzbach, which freed Silesia from French control. Treitschke
approvingly noted Blucher’s “joy of battle,” and his brilliant victory, which “awakened
what is absolutely essential to every national war, a delight in a national hero...Blücher’s
name was in every mouth.”'^' The emaneipation of Berlin produced a similar effect on
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the national consciousness:
What bursts o f joy and sorrow; there was no end to expressions o f thankfulness and to
embracing; in a thousand moving lineaments was displayed the holy power o f love which
a just war awakens in noble nations.

Such an interpretation of the Wars of Liberation may not be entirely accurate.
David Blackboum argues that “the ‘war of national liberation’ described by later
nationalists was largely a legend.” He notes that attempts to petition the German nation
“met with widespread indifference.” High rates of desertion also indicate the lack of
national enthusiasm on the part of the soldiers. Blackboum finally concludes, “There
was no spontaneous Pmssian uprising in 1813, let alone a German-wide movement.. .The
role of the volunteer detachments was exaggerated by nationalist historiography.” ^
The creation of the German Confederation destroyed any hopes of a peaceful
political integration of Germany; now the ideal of a German nation could only be realized
through war. “The new Germany,” wrote Treitschke, “could be created only with the aid
o f the sword.”*^'^ He did, though, see a silver lining to this dismal situation. While the
Germanic Confederation effectively stifled the German national movement and kept the
German states in a subordinate position to Austria, it failed “to prevent the increase in
strength of the one really living German state.” That state—Pmssia, of course—“was
destined at a later date to destroy that Federation, and to bestow upon our unhappy nation
a new and worthy order.”’^^ Yet again, Treitschke had made the mistake of suggesting
that the German Reich o f 1871 had been the historical objective of Pmssian statesmen.
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VI. Conclusion
Throughout his career as a historian, Heinrich von Treitschke committed what
David Hackett Fischer has called simply the “historian’s fallacy,” namely the mistake of
portraying the moves of past actors as consciously working to achieve present reality.
In other words, “this fallacy consists in the tendency of historians, with their retrospective
advantages, to forget that their subjects did not know what was coming next.”’^^ This
particular fallacy points up the central flaw of Treitschke’s work. Whether they were
acting in 1670 or 1870, Treitschke maintained that all Prussian statesmen sought German
national unification when, in fact, their actions were usually not motivated by desires for
German unity. For instance, Treitschke could look back on the work of Motz and the
creation of the Zollverein and argue that it was a conscious move toward unification. The
reality, o f course, was that Motz was not concerned with national unity at all, even
though in retrospect the customs union had provided a useful framework for unification
in 1866 and 1870.
Despite the fallaciousness of Treitschke’s history and its historical inaccuracy—or
probably because of it—the effect of his works was to create a coherent national mission
for Germany. Through his German History he constructed a German past that celebrated
the role of the Prussian state in defending and promoting the interests of the German
people and working to achieve German national unity. This mission was often
accomplished in the face o f opposition from Austria, France, and Britain. Treitschke also
presented Prussia— and later Germany—as the defender of religious and intellectual
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freedom. This Protestant land was a haven from the spiritual tyranny of Rome and the
overweening domination of Austria.
O f course, when Treitschke wrote his History and delivered his lectures on
politics, German political unity had already been achieved. This development did not
make the message o f his History obsolete, though. He intended his compatriots to adopt
the Prussian mission as their own, strengthening their national state and asserting
Germany as a world power. Treitschke wanted Germany to become a leader of
humanity, a “new Israel.” This call did not go unnoticed. Treitschke’s History was
widely read in late nineteenth-century Germany and many shared the historian’s
enthusiasm for state power, imperial expansion, and war.
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Treitschke enjoyed tremendous popularity as both a lecturer and a publicist. His
widely read German History went through several editions. The ideas Treitschke
presented had a significant impact on many Germans and the way they thought about
their nation. Friedrich von Bemhardi, who was the first Prussian soldier to ride under the
Arc de Triomphe in 1871, “swinging his sabre [as] he led his squad of horse” through the
French national monument,* was one German whom Treitschke’s national mission had
greatly infiueneed. After beginning his career in the Prussian army in 1869, Bemhardi
had served in the German military in various capacities until his first retirement in 1909.
With the outbreak o f hostilities in 1914 he came out of retirement to serve during the
First World War.^ Throughout his career he had made a name for himself publishing
books on military theory, but in the years prior to the Great War Bemhardi also published
several highly politicized works calling on Germans to assert themselves as a great world
power. These works revealed his enthusiasm for a radical policy of imperial expansion
and militarism.
Bemhardi’s extreme views have attracted the attention of many scholars of
political science and intemational relations, who have attempted to analyze the German
general’s theories o f nationalism, imperialism, and militarism. Mike Hawkins has
classified Bemhardi’s theories as unmistakably social Darwinist, arguing that he
“inferred the inevitability of conflict from the pressure of population on resourees.”^
While Bemhardi’s work closely resembled that of Treitschke, Hawkins rightly points out
that “Bemhardi went beyond Treitsehke to argue that the interests of the nation-state had
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to be understood within the context of biological imperatives.”'* Paul Crook agrees that
Bemhardi's work, with its arguments for the “biological necessity” o f war and
imperialism, had a distinct Darwinian component.^
Another scholar has classified Bemhardi's worldview as both “hierarchic realist,”
a classification that “postulates that nations live in a state of conflictual super- and
subordination,” and “militaristic imperialism,” a fairly self-explanatory category.®
Hierarchic realists, explains Jürg Martin Gabriel, reject the existence of an equilibrium of
approximately equal states and instead view intemational relations as an endless stmggle
for hegemony. They accept war as an unavoidable and even desirable feature of
intemational life. For these theorists war possesses a positive moral value and is viewed
as an end in itself rather than a means to some other end. Hierarchic realist theorists also
tend to view history and intemational relations as cyclical, with strong actors rising to
hegemony as their competitors decline, and so on.^
All of these observers have underscored that Bemhardi encouraged Germany to
rise to hegemony in Europe and eventually in the world by a policy o f imperial
expansion. To further that end he advocated war as a positive and, indeed, a necessary
exercise in his nation’s stmggle for world power. Bemhardi’s work had a strongly
Anglophobic component. For Germany, an impending hegemonic showdown with Great
Britain was inevitable.
Gabriel has observed that Bemhardi’s philosophy of idealism saw in man a need
for spiritual and moral development, not simply material comfort. Bemhardi often
Hawkins, 209.
^ Crook, 82-83.
^ Jürg Martin Gabriel, Worldviews and Theories o f International Relations (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1994), 3 and 42.
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juxtaposed his conception of idealism to Anglo-Saxon materialism, which he viewed as a
shallow and single-minded pursuit of material gain.* Like Treitschke, Bemhardi saw a
need for a strong state that could stand above the masses, mitigating differences among
interest groups and cultivating the nation’s moral fiber.
These radical ideas were presented in a number of widely read books that
Bemhardi published during his first retirement from 1909 to 1914, except for one essay
published in 1890. These works, namely Videant Consules (1890), Germany and the
Next War (1912), and Our Future—A Word o f Warning to the German Nation (1912),
closely mirrored the doctrines presented by the national historian Heinrich von
Treitschke, whom he frequently cited, particularly his German History and his Politics.
Treitschke undoubtedly had an impact on the intellectual development of Bemhardi, but
more than anything the General could rely on the historian to provide legitimacy for his
own radical ideas. By including the ideas, and indeed the very words, of Treitschke in
his own works, Bemhardi added a degree of “scientific” authority to his own theories of
intemational relations and Germany’s national mission.
In his intellectual development, Bemhardi was strongly influenced by his father
Theodor von Bemhardi. Although hom in Berlin on Febmary 6, 1803, the elder
Bemhardi grew up under Tsarist control in Estonia. In part due to his inability to
advance within the Russian bureaucracy and his failure to secure a position at the
Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, Theodor emigrated to Germany in 1851 and
eventually settled at Kunnersdorf in Silesia. Probably as a result of his professional
frustrations, Bemhardi developed vehemently anti-Russian sentiments. Loren Campion
observes that “[b]y the year 1851 he already felt so convinced of a coming showdown
* Gabriel, 44,
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between Germandom and Slavdom that he left the Tsarist Empire in order that his two
sons would not have to fight on the Russian side.”^
After settling in Prussia, Theodor made a name for himself as a writer, publishing
several highly acclaimed historical and political works. In 1854, in the midst of the
Crimean War, Bemhardi traveled to Warsaw to get a sense of the political situation in the
Russian Empire and wrote “Russia in March and April 1854” upon his return to Prussia.
The memorandum made the rounds among the Prussian political elite, finally reaching
the hands o f Prince William, the future King William 1, who was impressed by the
work.^*^ The following year Bemhardi produced “Russia as Nicholas 1 Leaves It,” which
made an even greater impression than his first memo. A biographical study of Carl
Friedrich von Toll, an allied general-quartermaster at the Battle of Dresden in 1813, in
1856 brought Bemhardi literary renown and gained him access to Berlin high society."
In 1863 he drafted “On the Polish Uprising of 1863.”" In 1881 he wrote two volumes
entitled Frederick the Great as a Military CommanderP
Theodor von Bemhardi’s writings revealed all of the Russophobic biases that he
harbored in his personal life. Campion provides some valuable insight into the writings
o f Bemhardi, noting that in his work on Toll—which was essentially a military history of
the years 1812-1814— the author gave Pmssia's role in the Wars of Liberation a “forceful
shove into the foreground.”" He lauded the actions of Pmssians and ethnic Germans,
while downplaying the contributions of General Kutuzov and other Russians. Of
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particular importance in Bemhardi’s interpretation was the Livonian-German general
Michael Barelay de Tolly. “Bemhardi went so far as to give the Livonian chief credit for
saving the Tsar’s army from destmction at Borodino,” explains Campion. “In faet [he]
designated him as the hero of Borodino purely and simply” *^ Bemhardi’s other writings
and the records of his conversations continued along these lines, criticizing Russian
society and revealing their author’s anti-Russian inclinations.^^
With his literary suceess, Theodor von Bemhardi quickly rose to the top of
Prussian society and socialized with many of the state’s elite, ineluding the crown prince
and prineess. Field Marshall von Moltke, and the historian Heinrich von Treitschke.
Bemhardi was indeed popular and influential as a publicist, but despite all his aeclaim he
attraeted some notable critics. Both Bismarck and the novelist and eritie Gustav Freytag,
a close friend o f Treitschke, failed to share the great admiration of Bemhardi that so
many other Germans had. Freytag had a low opinion of his Russian history and was also
repelled by his apparent egotism.'* Bismarck acknowledged Bemhardi’s eontributions as
a military writer, but offered some seathing eriticism of the author’s work:
He writes agreeably and as for a feuilleton, but when I go through his closely, minutely,
and ornamentally written reports, there is really nothing there, what with all their
lengthiness.

In spite of his opinion of Bemhardi’s works, the chancellor apparently recognized some
talent in the man. In 1866 Bemhardi served as a representative of Bismarek in Italy and
was also active diplomatieally in Italy and in Spain until 1871. Theodor von Bemhardi
died in Kunnersdorf on Febmary 12, 1887.^"
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Theodor’s son, Friedrich von Bemhardi, was according to Campion an “Even
Harder Chip Off the Old Block,”^* a fitting characterization considering the even more
intense German chauvinism o f the younger Bemhardi, who shared his father’s
Russophobia. Over time, though, Friedrich von Bemhardi began to see England, not
Russia, as Germany’s tme rival in her rise as a world power. In the years leading up to
World War I, Bemhardi’s works revealed an intense Anglophobia as he attempted to rally
Germans to oppose British designs around the globe.
Bom on September 22, 1849, in Petersburg, Friedrich von Bemhardi grew up on
his father’s manor in Silesia and was educated in Berlin. In 1869 he became an officer in
the Fourteenth Hussar Regiment in Kassel. During the Franco-Pmssian War he fought in
the Battle of Worth, receiving the Iron Cross for his performance. Although not active at
Sedan, Bemhardi did have the previously mentioned honor o f being the first Pmssian
soldier to pass through the Arc de Triomphe.
After the war, Bemhardi continued his career in the military. In 1872 he joined
the Fifth Dragoons in Frankfurt and that same year entered the War Academy in Berlin.
While in Berlin in the 1870s Bemhardi made the acquaintance of Treitschke and
Droysen, two men whom he credited in his memoirs “for a large part of [his]
education.”^^ In 1879 he was appointed to the Grand General Staff’s Topographical
Department and in 1882 sent to Greece with orders to map the southem part of Attica for
the Greeks. In 1883 Bemhardi retumed to the Grand General Staff to direct a surveying
department. 1886 witnessed Bemhardi’s appointment to the German army’s 15*
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Division at Cologne; 1888 saw his move to Düsseldorf as squadron chief of the 5*

Uhlans?'^
Like his father before him, literary skills won Friedrich von Bemhardi
considerable acclaim and admiration. In 1890, writing on behalf of the General Staff, he
penned Videant Consules, Ne Quid Respublica Detrimenti Capiat, which appeared
anonymously in German bookstores in spring of that year.^^ Appearing in the wake of
Bismarck’s retirement as chancellor, the pamphlet reflected the strongly anti-Russian
sentiments of the German General Staff and the anti-Bismarckian faction in the Imperial
government. Led by Count Alfred von Waldersee, this group sensationalized the threat
of a concerted Franco-Russian attack on Germany and advocated a preventive war
against these enemies.^^
In Videant Consules Bemhardi’s chauvinism shined through. The overriding
message of the work was one o f impending battle with threatening “Slavdom” in the
East. Bemhardi wamed that Russia “[was] preparing itself methodically and
energetically for an aggressive war against Germany” and that “all circumstances [in
Russia] press for an offensive war.”^^ The writer alerted his audience to the dangerous
menace o f Pan-Slavism, which “recognizes its greatest adversary in newly-strengthened
Teutondom, which today is the chief torchbearer of all traly humanitarian cultural
efforts.” Bemhardi observed among the Pan-Slavists “a profound national hatred for
Germany and everything German.” He saw war as inevitable and unavoidable: “Pan-
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Slavism must by nature press for war, as expansion is its condition for existence.”^*
The author’s hierarchic realist worldview is apparent. In Videant Consules
Bemhardi reminded Germans that they must increase their political influence and spread
their culture and revealed his militarist imperialist approach to intemational relations as
well as his debt to Treitschke. “For a great people like ourselves cannot renounce
dissemination of its culture,” wrote Bemhardi,
[and] a gradual enlargement o f its spheres o f interest and influence. It cannot at all
escape doing those things without retrogressing in its political and historical importance.
This we can leam on every page o f world history.

Bemhardi went so far as to insist that it was Germany’s cultural mission to battle with
Russia: “we too will again resume our age-old cultural mission against Slavdom, and in
so doing will clash with the latter’s need to expand.”^*^ “[The] Battle of German
Teutonism against Pan-Slavism,” wrote Bemhardi, “that will be the hallmark of the next
historical epoch.”^’ Bemhardi argued that all of Germany’s political resources must be
concentrated on the task o f the impending showdown with Russia:
our whole policy must be home by the fundamental concept o f settling accounts and
reaching an understanding with France, in order to be able to throw all the vital forces o f
the nation into the balance for the great Teutonie cultural missions against Russia.

Videant Consules revealed Bemhardi’s attitude toward war as a sometimes
necessary and even beneficial phenomenon in human development. He argued that
“individualism, the formation of states, the separate development of nations” achieve a
“higher meaning” only when “those endeavors contend together in the great contest for
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the highest goals of the human race.”^^ Furthermore, “it is the moral and historical duty
o f the state to intervene with all its might.” The state can intervene “through the peaceful
competition of toil, but when circumstances call for it, with the sword.” The state must
fight “for the ideas and ideals which appear to it...as necessary requisites for progress.”
Finally, Bemhardi stated that war “is also one of the most necessary requisites of all
human progress, and as such in some circumstances is a moral obligation.
At the time of the publication of Videant Consules ’ Bemhardi also experimented
in spiritism and “dabbled in the occult,” allegedly practicing telepathy with a fellow
officer’s wife.^^ It was a revealing aspect of his personality that may partly explain his
almost mystical belief in the creative and rejuvenating aspects of war, his glorification of
the state, and utter rejection of materialism. Bemhardi had married Armgard von
Klitzing in 1881, who died in the summer o f 1890. Campion suggests that “[t]his last
event helped shove him farther still in the direction of occultism and preoccupation with
life beyond the grave.”^^ The General began frequenting Berlin mystics and “[h]is long
standing interest in thought- and will-transference, second-sight, and Doppelgangerei,
etc., now intensified.”^^
After the publication o f Videant Consules, Bemhardi made a number of career
moves. In 1891 he was appointed German military attaché in Bem. After a failed
attempt to transfer to Turkey, Bemhardi married Fraulein von Colomb in 1893 and was
appointed commander o f the Baden Body-Dragoons Regiment No. 20 in Karlsmhe. In
1897 he became chief of the General Staff of the XVIth Army Corps at Metz. Very
” Ibid., 135-136.
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shortly thereafter he took charge of the Military History Department of the Grand
General Staff, where he worked for three years until 1900. Following his stint as a
historian, the General accepted several other military appointments, climbing nearly to
the top of the German army . In 1909, then 60 years old and in bad health, he retired from
active duty.^*
During this time Bemhardi continued to write, publishing two very important
theoretical works: Cavalry in Future Wars (1899) and Cavalry in War and Peace
(1910).^^ These two works brought him wide acclaim as a military theorist. The General
had portrayed the American Civil War as “the best model for the future use of cavalry”
and his theories were especially well received in the United St a t e s . De s p i t e the
dramatic changes that modem technology had wrought on modem warfare, Bemhardi
still believed that the cavalry represented a valuable unit of any army. In fact, Antonio
Echevarria observes, “Bemhardi believed that the deadliness of tactical means had only
increased the strategic value of cavalry.”"^' In particular, he argued that cavalry could be
especially useful for several kinds of operations. First, armies could take advantage of
cavalry “to execute more long-range or strategic reconnaissance missions.”'^^ Secondly,
because modem warfare would increase the length and importance of lines of
communication, as the immensity o f armies eliminated the possibility of “[living] off the
land,” “cavalry should execute raids more frequently against the enemy’s lines of
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communication and s u p p l y . H e believed that Germany would not only faee the new
challenges of modem military technology, but that Germany’s opponents would also be
“more determined and capable” than they had been in 1870-71
Bemhardi’s publieations in the immediate prewar years demonstrated most
clearly the influence o f Treitsehke upon his thought, as well as his use of Treitschke to
give his theories a higher degree of seientifie authority. Bemhardi eited Treitsehke in
varying degrees in these publications, extensively in some and not at all in others, but the
eore ideas o f Treitschke’s thoughts are clearly evident in all of these works. As Gabriel
writes, “reekless militarism and their glorifieation of war” are what join Bemhardi and
Treitschke. Moreover, the nationalistic aspects of Treitschke’s works were most clearly
refleeted in Bemhardi’s Germany and the Next War (1912), Our Future—A Word o f
Warning to the German Nation (1912), and On War o f Today (1912). These publications
mirrored Treitschke’s German chauvinism, veneration of the state, Anglophobia, imperial
enthusiasm, and strong belief in the benefits and moral value of war.
It is in Germany and the Next War (1912) that Bemhardi most obviously relied on
Treitschke both as an inspiration and as an authority.'*^ Carlton Hayes eorrectly observes,
“Bemhardi cites Treitsehke no less than twenty times within a hundred pages and utilizes
his phrases as texts about whieh to eonstmct elaborate theories of imperialism and
militarism.”'^^ In this book the German general set for himself the same task that
Treitschke had adopted roughly four decades earlier—to “most effectually rouse the
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national feeling in my readers’ hearts, and strengthen the national purpose.”'*^ The
practical consequences of Bemhardi’s book remain uncertain, but Paul Kennedy
maintains that in 1912 Germany and the Next War, along with the president of the PanGerman League Heinrich Class’s Wenn ich der Kaiser war, was one of the country’s
“two political ‘best-sellers.’”'*^ Gabriel notes that the book was “an immediate
sensation.”'*^
The ideas Bemhardi presented in Germany and the Next War represent a prime
example o f what Gabriel calls “militaristic imperialism” in international relations theory.
In fact, Gabriel presents Bemhardi as his only model for this approach to international
politics, although it seems that Treitschke would make an equally appropriate model for
this classification as well. The most pervasive and profound theme of Germany and the
Next War is that the pre-World War I peace of Europe was not beneficial. Rather, it was
a hindrance to the healthy development of national life. As Gabriel points out, Bemhardi
begins his book with an indictment of Kant’s Perpetual Peaee, claiming that it unjustly
convinced many of the general’s contemporaries “that war is the destmction of all good
and the origin of all evil.”^** He chastised the Germans’ for their alleged “stronglymarked love of peace,” which he blamed in part on the materialism of the masses, who
did not wish to disrapt their commercial life.^* He wrote that German political power
was “fettered” by this “love o f peace,” which “threaten[s] to poison the souls of the
German people.”^^ Finally, this ubiquitous desire for peace must be extinguished, for
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“the maintenance of peace never can or may be the goal of a poliey.”^^
Obviously, the alternative to peace is war, which was exactly what Bemhardi
wanted for his nation. In the first two chapters of his book, titled “The Right to Make
War” and “The Duty to Make War,” the author attempted to prove the necessity of war
by arguing that it was an inevitable and desirable aspect of nature and the relations
among nations. Bemhardi’s discussion of war revealed the social Darwinist element in
his thought. He asserted that “[w]ar is a biological necessity” and “the father of all
things.”^'* It has “destmctive as well as creative and purifying power.

War, unlike

peace, had the ability to “arouse national life and to expand national power [more] than
any other means known to history,”^^ an argument made by Treitschke before him but
without the Darwinian basis that Bemhardi included. Bemhardi attempted to give war a
deep cultural significance, asserting that it represented “an indispensable factor of
culture, in which a tme civilized nation finds the highest expression of strength and
vitality.”^^ He assigned moral value to war and called it “a moral necessity, if it is waged
to protect the highest and most valuable interests of a nation.”^*
In his analysis of the drawbacks of peace and the virtues of war, Bemhardi drew
on Treitschke to bolster his argument. He included several quotations from Treitschke’s
Politics and his German History that lent some legitimacy to his extreme statements. In
regard to the undesirability of peace he included Treitschke’s statement that “[i]t has
always been the weary, spiritless, and exhausted ages which have played with the dream
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o f perpetual peace.”^^ He also cited Treitschke to reinforce his statements on war: “God
will see to it that war always recurs as a drastic medicine for the human race."^^ In
another instance he quoted the historian to ‘prove’ that war held an unmatched positive
value: “A thousand touching traits testify to the sacred power o f the love which a
righteous war awakes in noble nations.”^^
In Germany and the Next War, Bemhardi also blatantly appealed to the German
nation to increase the power of the state, an ideal undoubtedly borrowed directly from
Treitschke. Bemhardi assigned moral value to this task, for the state “cannot attain its
great moral ends unless its political power increases.” The state ultimately exists for the
benefit of mankind: “[I]t is only the State which strives after an enlarged sphere of
influence that creates the conditions under which mankind develops into the most
splendid p e r f e c t i o n . T h e national state should exist as a high authority standing above
the straggling masses “not merely to protect, but actively to promote, the moral and
spiritual interests o f society.”^^ In a state that fails to enhance its power or even loses
power, “its citizens become stunted.” ^ In order to protect its power and other “higher
interests,” the state must not only possess the requisite power, but also increase its power.
For Bemhardi that was “the first and foremost duty of the State.”^^ The General offered a
very pessimistic view o f human nature—man cannot perfect himself by his own efforts,
so he requires a strong state to promote his intellectual and moral development.^^
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Bemhardi the propagandist relied on Treitschke the historian to provide
legitimacy and authority to his theories of the state, its duties, and its powers. Both
shared the same notions of the state’s moral duties and responsibilities. As Treitschke
wrote, “The State is a moral community It is called upon to educate the human race by
positive achievement, and its ultimate object is that a nation should develop in it and
through it into [sic] a real character; that is, alike for nation and individuals, the highest
moral task.”^^ Like Treitschke before him, Bemhardi also voiced his debt to Maehiavelli,
“the first to declare that the keynote of every policy was the advancement of power.” For
Maehiavelli, though, the state should seek to solidify and enhance its power simply as an
end in itself. It was Treitschke who qualified power as a means to moral ends: “power
must justify itself by being applied to the greatest good of mankind.”^* Bemhardi
acknowledged his debt to Treitschke for this idea; “I have thought it impossible to
explain the foundations of political morality better than in the words of our great national
historian.”^^
Bemhardi’s synthesis of militarism, imperialism, and state power constituted what
he called “idealism.” He railed against shallow materialism. For him man was a moral
being who could not be satisfied by mere material comforts: man’s “final purpose does
not rest on enjoyment, but on the development of intellectual and moral powers.”^*^
According to Bemhardi, materialistic nations like the British were inherently weak and
thus sought to maintain peace. By contrast, strong states do not fear wars that cultivate
morality. “It is political idealism which calls for war,” wrote Bemhardi, “while
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materialism—in theory, at least—repudiates it.”^’ Bemhardi found support for his
idealism in a passage from Treitschke’s Politics'.
War is elevating, because the individual disappears before the great conception o f the
State. The devotion o f the members o f a community to each other is nowhere so
splendidly conspicuous as in war.. .What a perversion o f morality to wish to abolish
heroism among men!^^

Bemhardi associated militarism, war, and a powerful state, with his conception of
idealism, while “[l]iberal individualism [was] put on the same footing as materialism,
egoism, weakness and peace.” As for his view of British society, it was “quite common
in Germany at the time.”^^
In Germany and the Next War Bemhardi also argued for the historical and
cultural mission o f Germany as the leader of civilization. In his chapter “Germany’s
Historical Mission,” Bemhardi offered a chauvinistic interpretation of German history
and culture. He made reckless claims about Germany’s invaluable contributions to world
civilization, at one point writing, “a high, if not the highest, importance for the entire
development o f the human race is ascribable to this German people.”^"* He portrayed
Germany as the guardian of intellectual freedom, describing the Reformation as a
German crasade against the “intellectual yoke, imposed by the Church, which checked all
free progress.” Also vital to the “intellectual and moral progress of man” was the
intellectual movement o f “the Critique of Pure Reason,” the work o f Kant that rightly
“pointed out the way knowledge is really possible.”^^
Like Treitschke, Bemhardi looked to the German past to support his claims about
Germany’s mission. In Germany and the Next War, he noted that Frederick the Great
F. V Bemhardi, Germany and the Next War, 26, quoted in Gabriel, 44.
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“recognized the ennobling effects of war,” and he viewed the Wars of Liberation as
having a great unifying effect on the German people/^ Bemhardi supported his theories
of war with historical examples, arguing that Frederick’s conquest of Silesia was
significant for Germany only because it was obtained by “a war of unparalleled heroism,”
rather than by peaceful means o f arbitration/^ It was Frederick the Great who astutely
realized that “it had become essential to enlarge the territory of the State,” if Prussia was
to survive in its precarious position in Central Europe/* Bemhardi also celebrated the
efforts of Schamhorst, who “grasped the idea of universal military service,” and of Stein,
who “laid the foundations of self government in Prassia.”^^ The author credited Kant for
teaching “the gospel of moral duty” and for contributing to “a revolution of duty''
whereas the French had experienced an inferior revolution of'‘‘‘rights” which ultimately
led to “individual irresponsibility and to a repudiation of the State.”*^
Bemhardi also assigned to Germany “duties of the greatest importance for the
whole advance of human civilization.”*^ In order to meet her responsibility as the leader
of world civilization, Germany must expand her intemational political power. “[T]he
German nation,” wrote Bemhardi, “from the standpoint of its importance to civilization,
is fully entitled not only to demand a place in the sun.. .but to aspire to an adequate share
in the sovereignty of the world far beyond the limits of its present sphere of influence.”*^
He eontended that if Germany was to compete with the other Great Powers she “must not
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hold back in the hard struggle for the sovereignty o f the world.”*^ He wanted to “stamp a
great part of humanity with the impress of the German spirit.”*'*
To become a world power, Bemhardi argued that Germany must pursue a
determined policy of overseas conquest and colonization. In addition to solidifying her
position within Europe, “an extension of our colonial possessions.. .must be the basis of
[Germany’s] future development.”*^ Germany must expand her colonial possessions in
order to rise to world power status. If she did not, history proves that she would
inevitably decline. This type o f cyclical interpretation of history was common at the
time, not only in Germany. Gabriel explains.
It was particularly fashionable to personalize the life o f nations, to think o f them as
having been bom, then reaching maturity and manhood, and finally growing old and
beginning to decline. Such ideas prevailed in many countries and were not a specifically
German invention.*®

According to this view. Great Britain had reached its age of decline. Now it was
Germany’s turn to reach “manhood” and assert itself as a world power.
Throughout his discussion of Germany’s historical mission, Bemhardi inserted
salient passages from Treitschke’s Politics and German History. In his Politics
Treitschke proclaimed that “it is quite imaginable that a eountry which owns no colonies
will no longer count among the European Great Powers, however powerful it may
otherwise be.”*^ A statement from Germany and the Next War appears as if it was lifted
directly out of Treitschke’s Politics: “In the future.. .the importance of Germany will rest
on two points; firstly, how many millions of men in the world speak German? Secondly,

Ibid., 79.
Ibid., 114.
Ibid., 85.
*®Gabriel, 49.
Treitschke, Politik 1: 8, quoted in F.v. Bemhardi, Germany and the Next War, 83.
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how many of them are politically members of the German Empire?”

In his Politics

Treitschke had asserted “that the whole position o f Germany depends on the number of
German-speaking millions in the future.”*^
Finally, Germany and the Next War revealed Bemhardi’s vehement Anglophobia,
which may have developed from his realization that Great Britain’s world empire and
powerful navy stood in the way of German colonial development. He claimed that
England had historically sought to maintain a balance of power on the Continent “to
prevent any one o f [the nations of Europe] attaining a pronounced supremacy.” While
the continental nations at times occupied one another, England was able to build its
“world Empire” unopposed. In light of this, argued Bemhardi, “England’s aim must be
to repress Germany, but strengthen France.”^^ He wamed of an attack from France in the
event of an Anglo-German confrontation. To prevent such an attack, “France must be so
completely crushed that she can never again come across our path.”^’ He later wrote,
“[English policy] doubtless wishes, by all and every means, even the most extreme, to
hinder every further expansion of German intemational influence and of German
maritime power.
Maritime power was a major concem of Bemhardi’s. He devoted an entire
chapter of his book to “The Next Naval War,” which he believed would inevitably “be
waged with England.”^^ He did not argue that Germany must necessarily cmsh England
and rise to world dominance. Rather, he was concemed primarily with Germany’s rise to

F.v. Bemhardi, Germany and the Next War, 83.
Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics 1: 118.
F.v. Bemhardi, Germany and the Next War, 98 and 103.
Ibid., 106.
Ibid., 103.
” Ibid., 155.
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world power status, which theoretically could happen in concert with Britain or without
her. He considered the chances of this happening peacefully and in cooperation with
England, but concluded that it would more likely happen unilaterally through war. He
did not instruct Germany to conquer, destroy, or dominate England. He did maintain,
however, that Germany must somehow reckon with the British if she were to achieve her
rightful place among the powers of the world. In the ensuing war with England, he
wrote, “we must conquer, or, at any rate, not allow ourselves to be defeated, for it will
decide whether we can attain a position as a World Power by the side of, and in spite of,
E n g l a n d . A c c o r d i n g to Bemhardi, Germany’s reckoning with England would benefit
not only the Reich, but the entire world; he portrayed the Germans as crusaders against
England for the intemational freedom of the seas.^^
In 1913, a year after the publication of Germany and the Next War, Bemhardi’s
Our Future—A Word o f Warning to the German Nation appeared in German bookstores.
J. Ellis Barker, the work’s English translator, gave it the provocative title “Britain as
Germany’s Vassal,” and correctly observed that it “is more popular in tone” than
Bemhardi’s earlier work.^^ Our Future was offered for only one-fifth the price, had a
wider readership, and made a greater impact on the German public than had Germany
and the Next War.^^ In his preface to the English edition Barker maintained that Our
Future “urges Germany to acquire by war first the supremacy in Europe and the
Mediterranean, and then the mastery of the world.”^* Barker clearly intended to stir up

^ Ibid., 164.
Ibid., 165.
^ J. Ellis Barker in his preface to F v. Bemhardi, Britain as Germany’s Vassal, translated by J. Ellis Barker
(New York: George H. Doran Company, 1914), 5.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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anti-German sentiment with his translation of Bemhardi’s book and his title and various
aspects o f his introduction are certainly overstated. Still, his assessment of the work is
basically accurate, although Bemhardi did not call for German “mastery” o f the world,
but rather her emergence as a world power among other powers. Throughout the book
Bemhardi presented his audience with an existential dilemma; “The question which calls
for an answer is whether Germany is to become a world-Power or is destined to decline.”
Bemhardi gave a clear answer: “[Germany] is a world-Power which is able and entitled
to give Germanism that position in the world which, by right, is its due.”^^
In Our Future Bemhardi reiterated many o f the same ideas he had presented in
Germany and the Next War. He argued that “[njational policy stands in the most intimate
relation with national civilization. It follows that national policy must be justified by
aiming at serving the high purposes of civilization.”*^® Again the idea o f state power and
expansion acquired a moral character, and again the German people, as “the most
important promoters o f modem civilization,”*®* were designated as the nation most able
to lead the development of the human race. As in Germany and the Next War, Bemhardi
traced Germany’s civilizing mission back to the Reformation, claiming that “[t]he fight
between Germanism and the papacy was a battle for the free development of human
civilization.”*®^ Although he did not quote Treitschke nearly as extensively in this work,
the resemblance to and the influence of the historian’s writings are evident. Indeed,
Bemhardi turned to Treitschke to lend authority to his claims of Germany’s cultural role
when he wrote, “Germany has enriched European civilization with new ideas and ideals.

^ F V . Bemhardi, Britain as Germany’s Vassal, 17.
Ibid., 26-27.
Ibid., 32.
Ibid., 34.
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and she is now occupying a place in the civilized world which cannot be filled by any
other people.”*®^
According to Bemhardi, Germany had to expand her political power.
“Confidently relying upon German strength and German civilization,” he wrote in Our
Future, “we Germans must try by all means in our power to acquire that political pre
eminence which corresponds with our importance in the world.”^^^ He advocated
German colonial expansion and the “[creation] everywhere [of] bases for the promotion
o f German civilization.”'*^^ German civilization should be promoted “in the interest of
the world’s civilization.”'*'^ As with Treitschke, the power of the state played a central
role in Bemhardi’s political thought. He also revealed the centrality o f the state in his
conception of idealism: “To the idealist the State is a teacher o f mankind.. .the State
requires a constantly growing political power.”'*'^
Finally, as the title of Barker’s translation made abundantly clear. Our Future
revealed Bemhardi’s strongly anti-British attitudes. He portrayed England as the most
formidable obstacle to Germany’s necessary expansion of political and economic
influence. “England,” wrote Bemhardi, “opposes us throughout the world with hostility,
and prevents us [from] acquiring colonies, the possession of which is for Germany a
question o f life or death.”'**^ The members of the Triple Entente “strive to keep down
Germany.”'*'^ In order to permit Germany’s rise as a world power, “England must give

Treitschke quoted by F.v. Bemhardi, Britain as Germany’s Vassal, 50.
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up her claim to a predominant position throughout the world.”'
In 1912, another o f Bemhardi’s important works, On War o f Today, appeared in
German bookstores. A condensed version of Hugh Rees’s English translation was
published in London in 1914 under the title How Germany Makes War}^^ As the original
German title implies, its author likened himself to a modem Clausewitz. Daniel J.
Hughes has aptly described Bemhardi as “a self-styled successor to Clausewitz as
Germany’s philosopher of war.”"^ Bemhardi agreed with Clausewitz’s famous maxim
that war is “a continuation of policy by other means.”"^ Yet he differed with Clausewitz
on one very fundamental point: “Clausewitz considers the defensive the stronger form of
conducting war. 1 do not share this opinion.”" '' Bemhardi sought to demonstrate the
changes in military strategy and theory necessitated by “three factors pressing a distinct
stamp on war of to-day—the masses, the improved arms of defence and offence, and the
modem means of communication.”"^ In short, Bemhardi attempted to reconcile the
traditional techniques of warfare with the consequences of modemization.
On War o f Today offered a critique of Sehlieffen’s conception of modem war,
arguing that it was too “mechanistic.” “Conducting war under these conditions can
scarcely be any longer called an art,” wrote Bemhardi. “It becomes a trade, and the
commander is, as it were, a mechanic.”"^ As an altemative to Sehlieffen, Bemhardi
presented what he called the “ingenious” theory of warfare. Whereas Sehlieffen’s

" “ Ibid., 82.
F. V . Bemhardi, How Germany Makes War, translated by Hugh Rees (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
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Daniel J. Hughes, “Schliehting, Sehlieffen, and the Prassian Theory o f War in 1914,” The Journal o f
M ilitary History, 59: 2 (April 1995): 268.
Bemhardi, How Germany Makes War, 149
"'^Ibid., 125.
Ibid., 234.
Bemhardi, Vom heutigen Krieg 2: 263, quoted in Eehevarria, 197.

106

“mechanistic” approach devised plans for battle before any evaluation of a particular
battle’s eireumstanees, Bemhardi’s “ingenious” approaeb did not devise a plan of attaek
until after a “due observation and assessment of the eireumstanees of the eonfliet.”*^’
While mainly a theoretical work, Bemhardi’s prefaee to On War o f Today did
expose some of the above-mentioned political attitudes of its author. He did not even get
beyond his first page before he mentioned the “neeessity” of a war—“on which the
further development of our people depends”—in defense of Germany’s “most vital
interest.”'^* As before, Bemhardi advoeated Germany’s colonial expansion and the
buildup of her power in Central Europe, and he reminded his audienee that Germany was
“a powerful, as well as a necessary, factor in the development of mankind.”^

Finally,

he wamed of the opposition of the English, a nation that “will most seriously resist any
real extension of Germany’s power.”'^^ In a later chapter on naval waifare Bemhardi
eautioned, “The English would surely not hesitate to seize the German eolonies in a war
with Germany.”*^* This prophecy of Bemhardi’s tumed out to be accurate.
Following the outbreak of World War 1 in 1914, British and Ameriean
propagandists portrayed Bemhardi’s works as prime examples of the popular German
mindset of the time. Paul Kennedy observes that by 1914 “[p]undits explained how the
spirit of Treitsehke and Bemhardi had eonquered the German mind.”*^^ Books like
Germany and the Next War and Our Future provided propaganda for German
chauvinists— and support for allied propaganda against Germany. In 1915, Stanhope W.
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Sprigg wrote that “neutral peoples have [reaeted] with amazement and disgust [to] that
revelation o f the German soul.”’^^
In response to such criticisms, Bemhardi published two pamphlets in 1915 in an
attempt to answer his critics abroad. Both Germany and England and The New
Bemhardi: “World Power or Downfall ” reveal an attempt to downplay the militaristic
and imperialistic rhetoric o f his earlier political works. In Germany and England,
Bemhardi argued that American critics based their condemnations on “an absolutely
erroneous understanding o f what 1 have written.”'^"^ He suggested that his books were
being used in the United States “for the purpose of stirring up public opinion against
Germany as the Power really responsible for the war.”*^^
For better or for worse, Bemhardi’s efforts to bolster his image fell on mostly
deaf ears. In his preface to The New Bernhardt, Sprigg maintained that “Bemhardi,
obedient with Potsdam obedience, has taken his orders to eat his words for the sake of
American opinion.”*^^ Sprigg’s critique was accurate. Although he sought to repair his
image overseas, Bemhardi made no apologies and continued to espouse his nationalistic
views. He continued to justify war by explaining, “1 have indeed proved, 1 think, that war
is a neeessity in the life of nations.”^^^ He retained his staunchly anti-British attitude:
“everywhere the English have undertaken to limit our national development.”^^^
Bemhardi also continued to express his debt to Treitsehke, confessing that “Treitsehke
undoubtedly contributed to the promotion of German consciousness of herself and to the
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fostering of the longing for increased political power.”*^^ Bemhardi rejected, however,
the claims of the British professor J.A. Cramb, who had vehemently criticized both
Treitschke and Bemhardi for their chauvinistic views, that Treitschke had advocated
German domination of the world. Overall, it was a poor attempt to mend his public
image in Britain and the United States.
While Bemhardi’s ideas were unquestionably reckless, they should not be viewed
as unique or peculiarly German. As early as December 1914 Carlton Hayes could
correctly observe that “the popular misconceptions of Darwinism and the application of
biological hypotheses on modem nationalism is lamentably not a peculiarity of
Germans.”' H a y e s pointed out the extreme enthusiasm in Britain for the royal navy and
overseas empire. Furthermore, Britons widely accepted notions of the “manifest destiny
of the Anglo-Saxon race” and Rudyard Kipling’s “white man’s burden.” Hayes criticized
Cramb’s attacks on Bemhardi and Treitschke for ignoring “the parallel thought in Great
Britain and France.”'^' Bemhardi had presented the German nation with the option of
“world-power or downfall,” wrote Hayes. “For Great Britain, and for France too, patriots
were soon to be found who would proclaim the same choice.”'^^
In his valuable article on the “cult of the offensive,” Stephen van Evera examines
the general European enthusiasm for offensive warfare in the years prior to 1914 He
argues.
Militaries [across Europe] glorified the offensive and adopted offensive military
doctrines, while civilian elites and publics assumed that the offense had the
advantage in warfare, and that offensive solutions to security problems were the
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most effective.

In Germany, Bemhardi was joined by General Alfred von Sehlieffen, the mastermind of
the infamous Sehlieffen Plan, and General Helmuth von Moltke. In Franee, enthusiasm
for offensive warfare was an “obsession” that affeeted Freneh military men and eivilians
alike. Van Evera eites the Freneh deputy Emile Durant, who in 1912 stated, “The idea of
the offense must penetrate the spirit of our nation.”*^"* In Britain, military strategists
“resolutely rejeeted defensive strategies” and in Russia the Minister o f War, General
V.A. Sukhomlinov urged, “We must also follow this example [of the other powers].
Even the Belgians were swept away by enthusiasm for the offensive.
So, while Anglo-Saxon criticisms of Treitschke and Bemhardi that the two were
indeed chauvinistic and imperialistic were certainly justified, their anti-German bias
wholly discredits them. British and American publicists sensationalized the two
Germans’ writings while blatantly ignoring the work of national and military enthusiasts
in their own countries. The historian should not regard Bemhardi as a peculiarly German
phenomenon. In fact, most European powers could lay claim to at least one or two
“Bemhardis” prior to World War 1.
The fact that Bemhardi’s theories can be seen as part of a greater European trend
should not, however, excuse his recklessness or the flaws in his arguments. In his
Historians ’ Fallacies, Fischer exposes the main fault in Bemhardi’s method. By using
Treitschke for scholarly authority, the general committed what Fischer has called the
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“fallacy of argument ad verecundiam," or “an appeal to authority.”*^^ One form of this
type o f fallacy is an “[appeal] to q u o t a t i o n s . B e m h a r d i ’s extensive references to
Treitschke’s works did nothing to amass evidence in support of his arguments; quoting
Treitschke simply reiterated points that Bemhardi had already made in his own words.
Fischer would argue that Bemhardi’s points “cannot be sustained by attribution” to
Treitschke. Rather, it was Bemhardi’s responsibility to “make an empirical case for
them,” which he was not able to do.'^^
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Treitschke’s words were received with approval and enthusiasm by large sections
of the German population in the closing years of the nineteenth century and the years
leading up to World War I. “In many German homes,” one observer has written, “the
family sat together in the evening to hear a chapter of the German History.”^ Andreas
Dorpalen asserts that Treitschke’s History “made its way into thousands of German
homes,” where it was “[ajccepted as theology rather than as history.”^ Peter Winzen
agrees that Treitschke’s historical work had a great impact upon the German people:
The five volumes which appeared between 1879 and 1894 were usually quickly sold out
and their contents often became the key talking points in Berlin salons and officers’
messes. Almost all the leading public figures o f the Bismarck era as well as large
sections o f the well-educated young people read Treitschke.^

Indeed, Treitschke’s work exerted such an influence on the popular mind of Germany
that Gordon Craig contends, “the serious student of German history can neglect
Treitschke’s writings only at the risk of losing an understanding of the psychological
factors that contributed to the fateful course of German polities before 1914.”'*
Many of Treitschke’s colleagues commended his efforts. Heinrich von Sybel and
his fellow editors at the Historische Zeitschrift issued complimentary reviews of
Treitschke’s History. In an 1886 review of Treitschke’s third volume of the German
History, G. Egelhaaf described the work as a “true pearl of the national literature” and
added, “Treitschke has shown us, and will show us yet more in the coming three
volumes, how the real foundations of the German state were gradually laid by the work of

* Ernst Leipprand, Heinrich von Treitschke im deutschen Geistesleben des 19. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart:
Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 1935), 254.
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Prussian statesmen.”^
Not all readers, however, expressed such sycophantic approval of Treitschke’s
scholarship. Upon the publication of the second volume of the German History,
Treitschke became embroiled in a protracted debate with the historian Hermann
Baumgarten regarding the scholarly integrity of his work. In a pamphlet entitled
“Treitschke’s Deutsche Geschichte,” Baumgarten chastised Sybel’s Historische
Zeitschrift for its favorable review of the German History. He also attacked Treitschke,
charging, “Treitschke’s entire book demonstrated a thoroughly unhistoric method of
research.”^ In his 1880 book about the Bismarckian era, Bruno Bauer branded Treitschke
as a “worthy representative of a loud and arrogant chauvinism.”^ In 1895 Theodor
Mommsen issued an equally damning critique of Treitschke’s work: “[Treitschke] is for
me the appropriate expression o f the brutalization that places our civilization in
question.”*
While Treitschke’s ideas received mixed reviews among the German academic
community, they had a great and formative impact upon many of Wilhelmine Germany’s
political elite. In an article entitled “Treitschke’s Influence on the Rise o f Imperialist and
Anti-British Nationalism in Germany,” Peter Winzen points out that Treitschke’s ideas
influenced the policies and thought of men such as the Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow
and the Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz. In his memoirs Bülow plainly stated that
Treitschke’s German History “became the basis of [his] political way o f thinking.”^

^ G. Egelhaaf, “Deutsche Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert,” in Heinrich von Sybel (ed.), Historische
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Tirpitz wrote in a similar vein in his own reminiscences, calling Treitschke the
“wonderful man whose lectures I heard at the university from 1876 onwards and who
also allowed me to seek his advice privately by scribbling my question on a scrap of
paper.” ’® Kaiser Wilhelm II recalled that out of all the highly esteemed scholars v/ho
visited his home when he was a child, “Treitschke made the deepest impression on me.””
The work of Bemhardi provides a striking example of the importance of
Treitschke’s thought among radical German nationalists prior to the First World War.
Bemhardi could have had several possible motives for citing Treitschke as extensively as
he did in his own works. First, Treitschke certainly had influenced the general’s
intellectual evolution, perhaps to such an extent that Bemhardi wished to acknowledge
this debt in his own publications. Second, even if Treitschke’s influence on Bemliardi
had been minimal, Bemhardi recognized the appeal that Treitsheke’s ideas had among
the German public.
The most plausible conclusion is a combination of the two. The general
undoubtedly received inspiration from the fiery Berlin professor, whom he acknowledged
in his memoirs as a significant influence on his intellectual development. More than
anything, though, Bemhardi relied on Treitschke to provide legitimacy for his own
radical ideas. By including many of Treitschke’s most extreme statements in his own
writings, Bemhardi provided his theories with “scientific” authority. In an age in which
people grasped for a “key” to history,’^ Treitschke provided a historical interpretation
that suggested that the rise and fall of nations provided the stimulus for all historieal
change. If Bemhardi could support his claims with the statements of Treitschke, a
Alfred von Tirpitz quoted in Winzen, 163.
” Emperor Wilhelm II, M y Early Life (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1926), 27-28.
Hannah Arendt, The Origins o f Totalitarianism, 225.
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renowned historian, they must have been legitimate, or would have at least appeared to be
so. Andreas Dorpalen explains that many Germans commonly held the ideas presented
by Treitschke at the time, hut “[sjtrengthening and deepening them, he endowed them
with an aura of scholarly respectability which added to their attraction.”'^ Treitschke’s
history and the national mission it championed provided legitimacy for the radical ideas
o f German nationalists in the pre-war years.
As mentioned above, following the outbreak of World War I scholars in Britain
and the United States, basing their conclusions in large part on the writings of Treitschke
and Bemhardi, determined that Germany represented a tragic aberration in western
civilization. This type of attitude regarding the alleged peculiarity of Germany and that
country’s political, social, and economic development raises an important issue in
German historiography, namely the extended and controversial debate surrounding the
notion o f a German Sonderweg, or “special path.” In their valuable book. The
Peculiarities o f German History}^ David Blackboum and Geoff Eley clearly lay out the
premises of the argument for a German Sonderweg. Essentially, in their attempts to
explain German historical development, many historians have argued that unlike Britain,
which had supposedly experienced a successful bourgeois revolution that entailed the
construction of liberal parliamentary government, Germany’s bourgeoisie failed to assert
itself in 1848 and then fell into a pattern of “ap[ing]” the aristocracy and its militaristic
and authoritarian values.'^ Blackboum and Eley condemn such arguments, suggesting
that they greatly oversimplify both German and British history, falsely treating all of
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German history as the “ante-room of Nazism” and reducing British history to a formula.
Treitschke, a proponent o f the 1848 Revolution who advocated state power and
martial values with increasing vehemence after that revolution failed to create a liberal
national state, would seem to be irrefutable evidence of a German Sonderweg, In fact,
Treitschke was himself a Sonderweg theorist, but of a slightly different nature.
Blackboum and Eley point out that while after World War 11 historians envisioned
German history as uniquely negative, many historians (and others) before the war
interpreted Germany’s political growth as uniquely positive:
after unification, there was a widespread tendency, especially among the academic and
professional Bildungsbürgertum, to exalt the particular German combination o f political,
economic, military, and educational institutions: monarchy and industrial success,
university and army.'’

Such thinking defined Treitschke’s writing. Moreover, “Germany’s special superiority
was very often defined vis-à-vis England,”'* another characteristic of Treitsehke’s
thought.
So at first glance, a study of Treitschke might appear to reinforce notions of a
German special path. When one looks beyond Treitschke and considers many of the
cultural and political trends throughout Europe in the late nineteenth century, however, it
becomes clear that a study of Treitschke does far more to refute notions of a German
Sonderweg than it does to reinforce them. While the present study focuses on Treitschke
and his impact in Germany, special care has been taken to demonstrate that he and
Bemhardi had counterparts in other European countries. As discussed above, most
European nations could boast of at least one or two national historians who presented
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their nation as a chosen people or as a people possessing a special national mission.
European states prior to World War I also had many military and civilian elites who
heralded the values o f imperialism and militarism as Bemhardi did in Germany. Thus, a
study of Treitschke and Bemhardi should be seen as a case study and nothing more.
In the end, o f course, the greatest flaw in Treitschke’s German mission was its
exaggerated emphasis on state power, a criticism that can also appropriately be leveled
against Bemhardi. “One also sees now,” writes Friedrich Meinecke,
how fatal it was for Treitschke him self to have restricted the essence o f the State
to power alone. A more comprehensive idea o f the State would have saved him
from taking the exaggerated view that concem for its own power was ‘absolutely
moral’ and took precedence, as a moral task, over all its other obligations.'®

Meinecke’s final indictment of Treitschke criticizes the historian’s “much too [lavish]”
use of the “predicate ‘moral.’” Ultimately, Treitschke’s careless and excessive use of the
adjective proved to be “clumsy and dangerous.”^^ While Treitschke cannot be held
exclusively accountable for the extreme German chauvinism, imperialism, and militarism
o f late Wilhelmine Germany, he indeed helped promote those sentiments and also
granted them a measure o f scientific authority. “What he did,” commented one of his
listeners, “was to give, with his strong voice, expression and emphasis to the emotions of
the national soul and the enthusiasms of our young people; he made the latter fully aware
o f their own feelings.”^*
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